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The Impact of Management’s Tone on the Perception of Management’s 
Credibility in Forecasting 
 
 
Robert D. Slater Jr. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of management 
altering its tone in communications on participants’ perceptions of management 
credibility. Management’s tone in communicating with participants was 
manipulated using communications from management under two treatment 
conditions. In period one of the study management’s tone was manipulated 
within the management statement on internal controls as required by the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB) Auditing Standards No. 2. In 
period one, participants had no knowledge of management’s prior forecasting 
accuracy. Consistent with predicted hypotheses, the findings reveal that 
management can increase its credibility with participants by communicating its 
empathy, responsiveness, and understanding. Management’s increased 
credibility was measured using both a validated credibility scale and by 
examining participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts.  In period two of the 
study all participants had knowledge of management’s forecast failure in period 
one. The results from period two found that tone could impact the rating of 
 viii 
management’s credibility when management had previously failed to meet a 
forecast but that tone had no impact on participant’s changes in their earnings 
per share estimates after management had previously failed to meet a forecast.   
 
 1 
1.0 Introduction  
The stock market has placed a great deal of importance on companies 
meeting earnings estimates, with stock prices often dropping for companies that 
fail to meet estimates. In addition to a drop in share price, management can lose 
credibility for failing to meet projected forecasts (Williams 1996; Mercer 2005).  
Credibility plays an important role in management’s ability to signal the market 
about its expected earnings and the market’s beliefs about management’s 
earnings signal (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001). The market will 
align with management’s beliefs when it receives signals from management that 
it perceives as more credible (Verrecchia 1983; Verrecchia 1990).  Therefore, it 
is important to study ways in which management credibility can be enhanced, 
allowing management to communicate with the market in a more efficient 
manner.  
Developing an understanding of the factors that affect management 
credibility will allow us to gain a better understanding of how management is able 
to communicate its beliefs about earnings to the market. However, there is some 
debate in the literature about the factors that make up credibility. The most recent 
studies have assumed that credibility is a two factor construct consisting of 
trustworthiness and expertise (Hirst 1994; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005), while 
there is evidence from the persuasion literature that credibility is a three factor 
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construct that includes as the third factor perceived intentions of the 
communicator (McCroskey and Teven 1999).   
The objective of this research is to test whether management’s credibility 
is impacted by investors’ perceptions of management’s intentions toward them. 
Also, in an attempt to reconcile the theoretical model of source credibility from 
McCroskey and Teven (1999) with the findings from accounting studies 
(Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2005), the impact of 
changes in management’s credibility on participants’ judgments will be examined. 
Specifically, this study examines participants’ ratings of management credibility 
and their reliance on information provided by management.  
To investigate participants’ perceptions of management’s credibility, this 
research manipulates management’s tone in written communications and 
measures the ensuing impact on participants’ perceptions of management’s 
credibility. The research investigates whether changing the tone in written 
communications allows management to alter participants’ perceptions of 
management’s intentions; thereby, increasing perceived credibility and also the 
degree to which participants rely on management’s forecast guidance (Hovland 
et al. 1953; McCroskey and Teven 1999).  The research also investigates 
whether management’s loss of credibility for failing to meet a projected forecast 
of earnings per share can be mitigated by the tone management uses to convey 
the news to shareholders in a written communication. 
The study manipulates management’s tone in two communications with 
participants under different circumstances. The first manipulation of 
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management’s tone will be delivered with the financial statements, in 
management’s statement about the company’s internal controls, as mandated by 
the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB)(2004) Auditing 
Standard No. 2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting Performed 
in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements.” This is a new standard that 
calls for management to report to investors on the internal controls of its 
company. While the report on internal controls is a mandatory communication 
management must make to investors, the wording of the report has not been 
specified by the PCAOB. This report was selected for study because it presents 
an opportunity to examine the possible effect different wording of a newly 
mandated report may have on investors’ judgments.  
Management’s tone is also manipulated after participants receive actual 
financial results for which management has inaccurately forecasted. As stated 
previously, management’s credibility should be reduced when it fails to meet a 
forecast (Jennings 1987; Hirst 1994; Williams 1996; Mercer 2005). The tone in 
management’s letter informing participants about the actual results of the quarter 
will be manipulated and the effects will be measured on both the perception of 
management’s credibility (measured by a credibility rating) and on the reliance on 
information supplied by management (measured by participants’ reliance on 
management’s forecasts).  
The results of this research should inform policymakers, such as the 
PCAOB, as to the effect different wording can have in communicating with 
investors. As indicated, Auditing Standard No. 2 (PCAOB, 2004, §163), leaves 
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the exact wording of the management statement on internal control up to 
management, stating that the report can “take many forms” as long as 
management states a direct conclusion about the effectiveness of internal 
controls. If it is found that subtle wording differences in required reports can 
impact investors’ perceptions, then the PCAOB may want to consider restricting 
the wording that could be used in such reports.   
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
theoretical background of the study and develops the proposed hypotheses. Prior 
studies investigating management credibility in forecasting will be examined in 
reference to a model of credibility from persuasion studies (O'Keefe 1990; 
McCroskey and Teven 1999; Perloff 2003). Formal hypotheses will be developed 
based on the theoretical model proposed. Chapter 3 explains the research 
method used to test the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. Also in Chapter 3, 
each of the variables in the study is defined. A formal research model is 
presented as well as the proposed statistical analyses of each of the hypotheses. 
The results of three pilot studies are also discussed. In Chapter 4, H1 through H4 
are statistically tested and results are presented to support the findings from the 
study. After analyzing the predicted results a post hoc analysis is conducted to 
examine the credibility construct further. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings of 
the study and presents the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the study. 
Limitations of the study are also presented in Chapter 5, as well as the overall 
contributions of the study.  
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2.0. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the impact of credibility on 
management forecasts. A formal model of the two factors (surprise and 
credibility) that have been found to affect investors’ belief revisions, with regard 
to management forecasts, is presented. Each of the factors (surprise and 
credibility) is discussed in general, and prior studies that have examined these 
factors are presented. One of the factors of this model – credibility – will be 
further analyzed within the context of source credibility theory (Hovland and 
Weiss 1951; O'Keefe 1990). A three factor model of credibility is discussed 
(McCroskey and Teven 1999), as are two measures of credibility – the impact of 
management’s past forecast accuracy and its tone in communications with 
investors. Based on source credibility theory, four hypotheses are then proposed 
regarding the effects of altering the tone of communications with investors and 
how the tone can influence management’s perceived credibility and the amount 
by which investors rely on management forecasts.  
2.1 Credibility and Management Forecasting 
Firms are required by the Securities and Exchange Commission to report 
certain financial information to investors. Additionally, many firms go beyond the 
mandated disclosures and make voluntary disclosures to investors. One example 
of a voluntary disclosure is a management earnings forecast.  
 6 
Voluntary disclosures, such as earnings forecasts, allow managers to 
share knowledge that is not already available to investors, and thereby reduce 
the amount of information asymmetry (Ajinkya and Gift 1984).  For management 
to determine whether to release voluntary information to investors, management 
needs to have an understanding of the true value of the information,1 the costs of 
disclosing the information, and an understanding of investors’ expectations. 
Management’s optimal threshold level of disclosure is simultaneously dependent 
on these three variables (Verrecchia 1983; Kim and Verrecchia 1991). Some 
analytical models of disclosure hold that once management reaches the 
disclosure threshold it always discloses truthfully, since it may face lawsuits if 
disclosures do not match the actual results (Hughes 1986). Research findings 
looking at management forecast disclosures are mixed as to whether 
management is truthful (i.e., unbiased) in its disclosures. Some studies have 
looked at management’s earnings forecasts and compared the forecasts to the 
actual results for the period and found that management’s forecasts were 
positively biased (Penman 1980; Waymire 1984; Clarkson et al. 1992; 
Mcconomy 1998).  While other studies, such as the one done by McNichols 
(1989), found no evidence that earnings forecasts were systematically biased, 
positively or negatively, but did find that investors did not take management 
forecasts at face value. McNichol’s finding indicates that investors perceived 
management’s forecasts as biased, or lacking some credibility. 
                                                 
1 The “true value of the information” is the understanding by management of the economic and 
competitive advantage of the information (Verrecchia 1983).  
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For the purposes of this study, whether or not management forecasts are 
actually biased is not as important as the finding that investors perceive 
management’s forecasts as biased, and discount them.  Finding that investors do 
not react as if management discloses honestly does not invalidate Verrecchia’s 
findings that management’s optimal threshold level is dependent on the type of 
information, disclosure costs, and current market expectations.  Instead the 
threshold level of disclosure shifts to a value that can include additional 
disclosure costs to establish management’s credibility with investors.  The 
increase in disclosure costs shifts management’s optimal level of disclosure to a 
point where greater information asymmetry must be present before management 
benefits from disclosure.  
This study investigates the effectiveness of a low cost method of 
influencing management’s perceived credibility. Management’s goodwill or 
perceived intentions, a factor affecting credibility, could potentially be 
manipulated at relatively low cost. Increasing management’s disclosure credibility 
with a low cost option such as modifying the tone of written communications with 
investors increases the quality of management’s disclosure, thereby, lowering the 
threshold at which management chooses to reduce information asymmetry 
(Verrecchia 1990). 
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2.2 Credibility and Investor Belief Revision 
2.2.1  Investors’ Reliance on Earnings Forecasts 
 Several empirical models offer a basis for determining how users 
incorporate management forecasts into their own beliefs. These models all 
contain management credibility or a similar construct (Patell 1976; King et al. 
1990; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001). The goal of this study is not 
to redefine these models into one single unified model; instead the goal of this 
study is to examine management credibility, one of the main factors of these 
models. It is generally held that the amount by which a user’s belief is revised is 
a combination of the credibility of management in making the disclosure and the 
surprise element of the information contained in the disclosure. Jennings (1987) 
proposes that the amount of belief revision is modeled as an interaction between 
management’s credibility and the newness (surprise) of the information contained 
in the forecast. The Jennings model is consistent with findings in accounting 
research on forecasts (Williams 1996; Mercer 2001), and models of credibility 
from the psychology literature (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland et al. 1953; 
Hovland and Pritzker 1957; O'Keefe 1990; McCroskey and Teven 1999; Perloff 
2003).  
The current study adapts the Jennings (1987) model, in that it models 
credibility and surprise as affecting investor belief revision.  However, since the 
current study holds the degree of surprise constant for all participants, the 
interaction of surprise with credibility is not modeled.  In the following section I 
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briefly discuss the notion of “surprise” before going on to discuss belief revision 
and credibility, which are the constructs of interest in this study. 
2.2.2  Information Surprise 
The surprise of the information contained in the forecast is the difference 
between the investor’s current level of belief based on the information set 
currently held and the new information in the forecast. Surprise is a measure of 
the degree of information asymmetry between management and investors. 
Surprise also represents the maximum belief revision management expects to 
generate with its disclosure, since the purpose of its disclosure is to bring 
investors’ expectations in line with its own. Management’s expectation that it can 
change beliefs is supported by studies in psychology that have found that a 
portion of a subject’s opinion change is a function of the difference between the 
current beliefs a subject has and the beliefs advocated by a communicator 
(Ewing 1942; Hovland and Pritzker 1957). Greater opinion changes occur when 
the difference between the subject’s beliefs and the communicator’s advocated 
message is larger. Surprise has also been referred to as the degree of 
conformity.2  The current study does not manipulate surprise between 
participants but instead seeks to hold it relatively constant across participants in 
order to examine the impact of credibility. 
                                                 
2 The degree of conformity can be an opinion in the same direction (pro-attitudinal) or in an 
opposite direction (counter-attitudinal). For example, both the receiver and the communicator can 
have the same pro-attitude toward a message but have a different level of belief.  
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2.2.3  Belief Revision 
 Belief revision in this study is defined as the difference between the 
current level of beliefs held by participants before receiving new information from 
management and the participants’ revised level of beliefs after receiving new 
information from management. Belief revision will equal the amount of surprise if 
the participants fully revise their beliefs to the new information provided by 
management.  According to some analytical models of disclosure, the current 
level of investors’ beliefs is one of the factors management must identify when 
deciding to make a disclosure (Verrecchia 1983; Kim and Verrecchia 1991). 
Disclosure costs increase as the difference between management’s disclosure 
and the market’s current level of belief increases. These costs can be actual 
costs paid for assurance on disclosures, the cost of compiling the information, 
costs associated with the loss of proprietary information, and indirect costs such 
as those related to credibility. 
 Measuring the market’s current level of belief is difficult to do. Prior 
accounting studies looking at management disclosures have used proxies for the 
market’s current level of belief. One such proxy was the stock price of a security 
before management released its information (McNichols 1989).  Other studies 
have used earnings per share estimates of analysts, and proxy the market’s 
current level of belief as the composite analyst forecast (Kasnik and Lev 1995).  
Behavioral studies looking at disclosure have given participants base information, 
such as the analysts’ composite forecast, to proxy for the market’s level of belief 
(Libby and Tan 1999; Mercer 2005). Giving participants base information is a 
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weakness in prior studies because it forces participants to integrate the given 
base information with their true current level of belief. Since their true or initial 
level of belief is not known, this leads to an anchoring and adjustment (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974) effect that is not captured in the study.  
  Hirst et al. (1999) tried to control for differences between participants’ 
initial levels of beliefs by using the participants’ initial predictions as a covariate in 
the data analysis. However, they also gave all of the participants (in each 
treatment) the same information regarding actual earnings. Therefore, to the 
extent that the difference between the initial prediction and actual earnings would 
vary across participants, the degree of surprise would have varied across 
participants potentially confounding the results. This study takes a unique 
approach to controlling for the interaction of the participants’ current level of 
beliefs and management’s disclosure. Instead of controlling for the current level 
of beliefs by giving participants a starting point, participants will be able to select 
their initial earnings per share estimate, and the actual earnings number released 
by management will be revealed as a set percentage increase over each 
participant’s initial prediction, thereby holding the degree of surprise relatively 
constant across participants. The approach taken in this study removes the 
possibility of an unmeasured anchoring effect that may have taken place in prior 
studies. 
2.2.4  Credibility  
 The factor affecting belief revision that is of interest in this study is the 
communicator’s credibility. Credibility is a measure of the perceived believability 
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of a communicator, where the perception of credibility is made by a message 
recipient (perceiver) (O'Keefe 1990).  Credibility is not a trait that can be directly 
observed. The amount of perceived credibility held by any one communicator 
may vary from one message recipient to another (O'Keefe 1990). Some message 
recipients will find one communicator highly credible while other recipients do not 
(O'Keefe 1990).  This is easily seen in the realm of politics where one candidate 
can be seen as quite credible by his/her followers but not very credible by those 
who support his/her opponent.  
Only one prior accounting study has looked at management’s credibility 
using a psychological model similar to the one used in this study. Management 
credibility is modeled by Mercer (2005) as the trustworthiness and expertise of 
management, which is consistent with prior models of credibility from the 
persuasion literature (O'Keefe 1990; Perloff 2003). Mercer (2005) looked at 
management’s failure to warn investors of a negative news surprise, and 
measured the failure’s impact on investor’s perception of management’s 
credibility. The study found management’s actions did impact credibility ratings; 
however, no assessment was made on how the change in credibility impacted 
investors’ reliance on management’s forecasts. Participants were asked if they 
would rely on future disclosures, and those who were in the higher credibility 
manipulation (i.e., the ones who were warned) did state they would rely on future 
disclosures.  Therefore, while accounting research suggests that credibility is 
composed of more than one factor (see Figure 1), the link between credibility 
ratings and investor judgments remains untested. To establish the link between 
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perceived credibility and investor judgments (specifically in a belief revision task) 
I use source credibility theory as applied in psychology and marketing.  
Source credibility theory posits that in most circumstances, the more 
credible a communicator, the more likely the communication will elicit change of 
beliefs in message recipients (Hovland and Weiss 1951; Hovland et al. 1953; 
O'Keefe 1990; DeZoort et al. 2003; Perloff 2003).3  In Figure 1, as the perceived 
credibility increases, so does the amount of investors’ belief revision. 
Management’s 
Internal Control 
Letter:
-High Intention Tone
-No Intention Tone
Management’s Earnings 
Results Letter:
-High Intention Tone
-No Intention Tone
Perceived Credibility:
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Intention
Perceived Credibility:
Expertise
Trustworthiness
Intention
Investor’s Belief Revision
(Change in EPS 
Predictions Period One, 
Before and After 
Management’s 
Prediction)  
Change In Investor’s 
Belief Revision
(Change in EPS 
Predictions Period Two, 
Before and After 
Management’s 
Prediction)  
H1
H2
H4 
Difference in Change in Investor’s Belief Revision
From Period One to Period Two
H3
Change in Perceived Credibility 
From Period One to Period Two
Period One Period Two
No Prior Information About 
Management’s Forecast 
Accuracy
Management’s Forecast 
Inaccuracy for Period One is 
Known
 
Figure 1. Investor Belief Revision Model 
                                                 
3 The circumstances in which more credibility does not equal more opinion change are discussed 
in detail in Appendix A as moderators to the model of credibility. 
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As indicated, support for the impact of perceived credibility on belief 
revision is found in marketing and psychology research (Gotlieb et al. 1992; 
Goldsmith et al. 2000; Lafferty et al. 2002). Goldsmith et al. (2000) examined 
both corporate credibility and endorser credibility and found that both impact 
users’ intentions to purchase products. The endorser credibility impacted the 
users’ attitude toward the advertisement, which in turn affected their intention to 
purchase, and attitude toward the brand. However, corporate credibility directly 
impacted users’ intention to purchase, as well as attitude toward the brand and 
attitude toward the ad (Goldsmith et al. 2000). Lafferty et al. (2002) tested the 
results of Goldsmith et al. (2000) and found support for corporate credibility 
directly impacting intention to purchase as well as the other paths found in 
Goldsmith et al. (2000). In several disciplines, the “intention to act” construct is 
used as a proxy for actual behavior based on the theory of planned behavior 
(Ajzen 2001).  This link between perceived credibility and user behavior provides 
support for the belief that investors’ perceptions of management’s credibility can 
impact investors’ decision-making. 
2.2.5  Perceived Management Credibility Factors 
 In order to understand what makes a communicator credible it is important 
to understand the factors that affect perceived credibility. Most studies of 
credibility use a two-factor model of credibility similar to the one used in Mercer’s 
(2005) study, with the two factors being expertise and trustworthiness 
(McGinnies and Ward 1980). This study employs the McCroskey and Teven 
(1999) model of credibility, which includes three factors: expertise, 
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trustworthiness and intentions. Since this model has not been used in judgment 
and decision making research, a factor analysis was conducted to examine the 
three factors. Using an oblique rotation, the factor analysis suggested the 18 
questions loaded on three unique factors4. Sixteen of the questions loaded on 
the correct factor, while two questions loaded higher on a factor other than their 
expected variable. The three original variables from McCroskey and Teven’s 
(1999) model were used in this study. No adjustment was made to the model for 
the two variables that loaded on a different factor in the factor analysis. Rather 
than examining the three factors individually, the main analyses in this study use 
all 18 questions of the credibility scale to measure total credibility. Thus, the 
discrepancy in the factor loadings does not impact the analyses in this study but 
should be addressed in future research.  To determine if the three sub-factors 
were measuring the same higher level credibility factor a Cronbach’s Alpha was 
calculated for the responses to the scale in the study from period one and period 
two.  The three sub-factors of credibility had a Cronbach’s Alpha of .912 for 
period one and .926 for period two.  
2.2.5.1 Expertise 
Hovland et al. (1953) define expertness as “the extent to which a 
communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions” (pg. 21). The more 
a perceiver believes someone is an expert in his/her field, the more credible the 
perceiver will find the communicator’s messages as they pertain to that particular 
                                                 
4 Two factors had Eigenvalues above 1 (11.959 and 1.706) with a third factor having an 
Eigenvalue of .97.  
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field. Prior research has found many different attributes can signal that someone 
is an expert (Hovland et al. 1953).  Hovland et al. (1953) identify age, position of 
leadership, and similarity between perceiver and communicator as factors that 
may invoke a perception of expertise.  The research to date (Hovland and Weiss 
1951; Hovland et al. 1953; O'Keefe 1990; Perloff 2003), indicates that 
communicators who are perceived as having greater expertise will be found to be 
more credible. The perception of expertise should be held constant in period one 
of the study. However, the manipulation in period two should cause expertise to 
drop since management fails to meet its forecast.  
2.2.5.2 Trustworthiness 
Hovland et al. (1953) define trustworthiness as “the degree of confidence in 
the communicator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most 
valid” (pg. 21).  It is possible for a communicator to be an expert in his/her 
domain but decide to communicate statements known to be invalid (Hovland et 
al. 1953).  Message recipients must form an opinion as to whether they believe 
an expert communicator is communicating truthfully. Those communicators 
perceived to be communicating truthfully are thought to have greater credibility. 
The perception of trustworthiness should be constant in period one of the study. 
However, the manipulation in period two should cause trustworthiness to drop 
since management fails to meet its forecast.  
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2.2.5.3  Goodwill (Intention Toward the Receiver) 
Hovland et al. (1953) also discussed a third factor of credibility, which they 
called “intention toward the receiver.”  As stated previously, trustworthiness 
measures the degree of confidence a receiver has in a communicator’s intention. 
The intention toward the receiver construct is the belief a receiver has about the 
communicator’s intention for communicating an assertion. Intention toward the 
receiver measures the belief about the communicator’s intentions, and 
trustworthiness measures the degree of confidence in the belief.  McCroskey and 
Teven (1999) propose that the construct’s goodwill and intentions towards the 
receiver are the same; thus, the third factor in their model of credibility is 
goodwill.  Goodwill has been excluded in some credibility models over the years 
because researchers believed that goodwill could not be measured properly 
(McCroskey and Teven 1999). McCroskey and Teven (1999) blame the poor 
measurements on factor analytic models that included extraneous “person 
perception” variables that hindered results.   
In this study, I will use McCroskey and Teven’s (1999) validated instrument 
to measure goodwill. However, I use the term “intention” or “intention toward the 
receiver,” since the term “goodwill” has another connotation in the field of 
accounting. (In accounting, goodwill is a measure of the purchase price of a 
company over its fair value.) There are three distinct elements to the intention 
factor: understanding, empathy, and responsiveness (McCroskey and Teven 
1999). Understanding is defined as knowing another person’s ideas, feelings, 
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and needs. Empathy is an acceptance of another’s view as valid. 
Responsiveness is viewed as the attentiveness of one to another.   
2.2.5.4 Other Factors That Can Impact the Effect of Credibility 
There are other factors that have been identified in the psychology 
literature that are believed to moderate credibility’s impact on belief revision. For 
example, the expected and actual position advocated by the message have been 
found to affect the perception of credibility factors (Eagly et al. 1978). How well 
liked the communicator is can affect credibility (Heider 1958; McCroskey 1966). 
Contextual factors such as the message recipient’s level of involvement with the 
topic (a combination of expertise and motivation), the degree of difference 
between current receiver beliefs and the beliefs presented in the message, and 
timing of identifying the communicator have been found to impact the effect 
credibility has on a message recipient’s belief revision (O'Keefe 1990). Because 
these factors are theoretically important, they will be included as possible 
covariates in the experiment; however, only the intention factor of credibility is 
measured in the current study. See Appendix A for a discussion of the 
moderating factors. 
2.2.6  Measuring Credibility Factors 
 While only one other accounting study (Mercer 2005) has tested credibility 
as a perception variable, other studies in accounting have explored the concept 
of credibility. Most studies, even in psychology, have difficulty separating and 
manipulating the first two factors of credibility, expertise and trustworthiness 
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(O'Keefe 1990).  This is especially true in accounting studies, where one 
measure for management credibility is management’s past forecast accuracy 
(Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999). Past accuracy in forecasting is a noisy 
measure of expertise or trustworthiness since participants do not know if 
management failed to make its forecast because it did not have the expertise to 
forecast correctly, or because it was intentionally misleading investors.   
2.2.6.1 Forecast Accuracy Information 
As indicated in the prior paragraph, extant accounting studies looking at 
the relationship between management’s credibility and investors’ reactions to 
forecasts have used management’s prior forecast accuracy as a proxy for 
management’s forecast credibility (Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996; 
Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001; Mercer 2004; Mercer 2005). Some studies 
assumed that investors’ reactions to an earnings forecast are a function of 
management’s credibility and the surprise or newness of the information being 
presented (Jennings 1987; Baginski and Hassell 1990; Williams 1996). Mercer’s 
studies (2001, 2004, 2005) measured management’s credibility as a perception 
variable with two factors, expertise and trustworthiness. Consistent with research 
findings that it is difficult to separate expertise and trustworthiness, Mercer found 
expertise and trustworthiness highly correlated variables that move together.  
Hirst et al. (1999) found evidence that credibility, as measured by prior 
forecast accuracy, was a significant factor in the earnings predictions of investors 
who used a management forecast in their decision-making.  Archival studies 
have also explored the relationship between management’s prior accuracy in 
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forecasting and the reaction of analysts to subsequent forecasts (Hassell et al. 
1988; Williams 1996). These studies differ only in the methods used and 
measurement of the variables. For example, Hassell et al.(1988) measured the 
effect of management earnings forecasts on the revision in earnings estimates of 
analysts, where the amount of change in analyst forecasts was dependent on 
management’s credibility as measured by the difference in earnings forecasts to 
actual earnings. They used the ex-post accuracy (actual accuracy) of previous 
forecasts to define management’s credibility.  They found that analyst forecasts 
did change after the release of a management projection.  The study implies that 
analysts’ beliefs were revised based on the credibility (prior accuracy) of 
management forecasts.  
Williams (1996) also studied prior forecast accuracy of management and 
operationalized prior accuracy as prior forecast usefulness, where usefulness is 
measured by whether a user would have been better off adjusting expectations 
of earnings to management’s forecast in a prior period. The relationship between 
the usefulness of a prior earnings forecast and analysts’ responses to a current 
forecast was studied. Exogenous variables, such as timing of the forecast and 
market price reactions, were controlled.  As predicted, management’s credibility 
(as determined by its prior forecasting ability) affected the way in which analysts 
reacted to current forecasts (Williams 1996). Therefore, when management’s 
prior forecasts were accurate, investors’ perceptions of management’s credibility 
increased. The increases in perceived credibility lead to analysts relying on future 
management forecasts when making their own forecasts. 
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Benjamin and Strawser (1976) conducted a behavioral study that looked 
at prior forecast accuracy. They gave investors annual reports that had earnings 
forecasts contained within the notes to the financial statements. Participants 
were told of the prior year’s forecast and actual results. Prior forecast accuracy 
was found to increase investors’ perceived credibility of management’s current 
forecast, as measured by participants’ earnings per share predictions relative to 
management’s forecast.  
In the Benjamin and Strawser study, participants were given explanations 
as to why prior management forecasts may have been inaccurate. These 
explanations included environmental variables that would not be directly 
attributable to management. Thus, Benjamin and Strawser’s results may have 
been affected by beliefs that management was not to blame for failing to forecast 
correctly.  Accordingly, the effect on investor’s perceptions of management being 
at fault for an inaccurate forecast is not known.  
The accuracy of an earnings forecast is a function of management’s 
forecasting ability and the business risks facing the firm (Davidson and Neu 
1993). Figure 2 models this relationship as presented in Davidson and Neu 
(1993). A manager can only make a forecast based on contemporaneous 
information available at the time he/she forecasts. If management uses sound 
procedures and valid assumptions in forecasting and still fails to forecast 
accurately, unforeseeable business risk factors could be contributing to actual 
earnings deviating from the forecast. Based on Davidson and Neu (1993), it is 
possible management’s prior forecast accuracy is a poor proxy for 
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management’s credibility. Further complicating the validity of forecast accuracy 
as a proxy for credibility is fundamental attribution error theory.  This theory 
predicts that people are more likely to attribute outcomes of events to 
dispositional factors rather than to situational factors (Heider 1958). Dispositional 
factors are internal factors associated with a person and situational factors are 
outside the control of an individual. 
Accuracy of
Earnings
Forecasts
Ability to 
Forecast
Business
Risk
 
Figure 2. Factors Affecting Management Forecasts (From Davidson and Nue, 1993) 
Two important dispositional factors discussed by Heider (1958) are 
intention and ability. Intention is someone’s desire to do and act, and ability is the 
individual’s power to take action. These constructs are similar in nature to the 
expertise, trustworthiness, and intention factors of credibility. Expertise is a level 
of ability. Intention is an external perception of someone’s desires, and 
trustworthiness is the belief that someone will or will not attempt to act on his/her 
desires. The components of credibility (expertise, trustworthiness, and intention) 
are all dispositional factors. Therefore, attribution theory (Heider 1958; Kelley 
1973; Reagan et al. 1974; Wood and Eagly 1981) suggests that investors would 
blame management’s failure to forecast accurately on internal factors, absent an 
external reason given for management’s failure. Investors may believe that a 
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missed forecast was due to such internal factors as management’s lack of 
expertise in forecasting or management’s willingness to forecast accurately 
(trustworthiness), thus reducing management’s credibility. Conversely, investors’ 
perceptions of management’s credibility increase when management’s prior 
forecasting accuracy increases (Jennings 1987; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999).  
Williams (1996) found that analysts relied more upon current management 
forecasts when management’s forecasts were more useful in the past. 
Management’s forecasts were considered more useful if, in the past, the new 
information management gave in its forecast was more accurate than the 
analysts’ current estimates. For example, two firms could predict and achieve 
their earnings per share at exactly the same amount of $4.00 per share. 
However, if analysts for the two firms expected that earnings would be $3.75 and 
$3.50, respectively, then management’s forecast was more useful in the case of 
the firm with the $3.50 analysts’ expectation. The Williams (1996) study was 
conducted using actual stock market forecast revisions made by analysts 
following an actual disclosure from a publicly traded company. Analysts’ forecast 
revisions were observed and management’s prior forecast accuracy was 
measured based on management’s real prior forecasts. Since the study was 
conducted using only archival data, there is no way to know if analysts actually 
used management’s prior forecast accuracy when making their revisions.  
 As shown by the review of prior studies, management’s accuracy in prior 
forecasting has a large impact on management’s credibility. The impact on 
management’s credibility in turn impacts the amount of investor belief revision 
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when management issues a forecast. In this study, two conditions of accuracy 
will be used. In the first condition participants will have no knowledge of 
management’s prior accuracy. In the second condition participants will not be told 
of management’s accuracy but they will be given a prior forecast from 
management that they will subsequently learn is inaccurate; thus, experiencing 
the inaccuracy first hand.  
2.2.6.2 Tone of Communications 
There is anecdotal evidence that management’s tone in communicating 
with investors can affect management’s perceived credibility with investors. 
Articles in recent public relations journals tout strategies that say management 
can increase or regain its credibility with investors by altering its tone in 
communications with investors, such as the company’s annual report (Budd 
2000; Calvey 2001; O'Brien 2001; Thompson 2002; Leckey 2003). At the same 
time, investor publications tell investors they can learn about a company from the 
tone a company takes in communicating with its shareholders (Rodgers 2002).  
Most shareholders will never physically meet the management of the 
companies in which they invest. Management’s communications to shareholders 
are often the only direct contact shareholders have with a company. It would be 
logical to assume that these written communications from management may be 
the best opportunity management has to convey its goodwill (intentions) toward 
investors. Thompson (2002) suggests that management can regain lost 
credibility by issuing communications to investors that “shoot straight.”  Could it 
be this simple for management to regain some of its lost credibility?  
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The intention of this study is to test management’s ability to increase its 
rating of credibility by communicating its intention toward investors via a written 
communication that conveys management’s understanding, empathy, and 
responsiveness. In period one, half the participants will receive an altered 
statement of internal control letter from management intended to convey its 
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness (intentions) at a high level. The 
treatment group receiving the high level letter will be referred to as the “high 
intention” treatment while the other treatment will be referred to as the “no 
intention” treatment.  Participants who perceive that management has better 
intentions toward them should rate management’s credibility higher than 
participants without such a perception.5  
Therefore, H1 states: 
H1:  Participants who receive an internal control letter from management 
with a high intention tone will rate management’s credibility higher 
than participants who are given an internal control letter with no 
intention tone.  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that participants will rate management’s credibility 
higher after receiving the internal control letter from management seeded with a 
high intention tone. Although McCroskey and Teven (1999) have already 
established this link using the credibility scale, credibility is also known to impact 
participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts. In accounting research, 
management’s perceived credibility is measured by the amount of revision 
participants make when receiving earnings guidance from management, ceteris 
                                                 
5 In period one of the study, only the intention variable of credibility has been manipulated in the 
communication; therefore, no predictions are made regarding the expertise and trustworthy 
factors of credibility.  
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paribus (Patell 1976; King et al. 1990; Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 
2001). Based on source credibility theory, higher perceived management 
credibility yields a greater amount of reliance by participants on management’s 
forecast. The greater the amount of reliance on management’s information the 
more credible management is thought to be. Therefore, consistent with source 
credibility theory, H2 predicts that participants who are given written 
communications from management (management’s internal control letter in 
period one of this study) with a high intention tone will perceive management as 
having higher credibility, and thus will rely on management’s forecast by revising 
their earnings per share predictions closer (greater revision) to management’s 
predictions.6  
H2:  Participants who receive an internal control letter from management 
with a high intention tone will rely more on management’s forecasts 
by revising their earnings per share estimates closer to 
management’s predictions than participants who receive an internal 
control letter with no intention tone.  
 
2.2.6.2 Tone of Communications versus Inaccurate Forecast 
The intention factor of credibility has not heretofore been studied in a 
judgment and decision-making setting. This study is designed to test the impact 
of management’s tone in communications on management’s credibility, including 
the intention factor, and then to test the ensuing effects on participants’ belief 
revisions. It is expected that the results of period one will show that the tone 
                                                 
6 The treatment in period one is the tone of the communication by management to shareholders. 
This tone is expected to impact the investors’ perception of management credibility. The letter 
used in period one of this study (the statement on the effectiveness of internal controls) is not 
expected to impact investor’s initial earnings per share estimates, only their perception of 
management’s credibility, and therefore their future reliance on management’s forecasts.  
 27 
management has with participants can increase its credibility. What is not known 
is whether that increase in credibility can substitute or outweigh the other two 
factors of credibility: expertise and trustworthiness. In order to test whether the 
different factors of credibility are substitutes for one another, the study will 
manipulate management’s accuracy between a level where participants have no 
knowledge of management’s past accuracy (period one) and a level where they 
know management has forecasted inaccurately (period two). In period two of this 
study all of the participants have had a previous experience with management in 
which management failed to meet an earnings per share forecast. It is expected 
that the participants will reduce their rating of management’s overall credibility, 
including their rating of management’s expertise and trustworthiness. Participants 
will receive a letter from management notifying them of management’s failure to 
meet its earnings per share estimate. The tone of the letter will be manipulated at 
two levels; one with a high intention tone and one with the no intention tone. 
When management forecasts inaccurately, its credibility should drop and 
participants should rely less on management’s forecast. But if management’s 
tone in letters to shareholders increases its intention factor of credibility when 
using a high intention tone, it should increase overall perceived credibility and 
allow management to effectively persuade participants of management’s beliefs.  
Therefore, H3 predicts that management’s tone in communications can 
mitigate lost credibility ratings from failing to forecast accurately. Based on 
source credibility theory, H4 predicts that management’s tone in communications 
can also lead to greater reliance on future management forecasts. 
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H3: Participants who receive an inaccurate forecast from management 
and receive an earnings notification letter from management with a 
high intention tone will not lower management’s credibility rating as 
much as participants who receive an inaccurate forecast from 
management and who are given an earnings notification letter from 
management with no intention tone. 
H4: Participants who are notified of an inaccurate forecast from 
management by an earnings notification letter that conveys a high 
intention tone will reduce the amount they rely on management’s 
future forecasts less than participants who receive an earnings 
notification letter from management conveying no intention tone. 
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3.0 Research Method 
3.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 2 a theoretical model was developed and hypotheses were 
proposed. This chapter details the testing of those hypotheses. A description of 
the research design, including a description of the task and participants is 
presented.  The measured and manipulated variables in this study will then be 
discussed. The measured variables include the dependent variables and the 
covariates. The manipulated variables are the independent variables. Following 
the discussion of the variables, a discussion of the three pilot studies that tested 
the research materials is presented.  The chapter ends with a discussion 
regarding the overall findings from the pilot studies.    
3.2 Research Design 
All participants completed the task under both a condition of no prior 
information about management’s forecast accuracy (period one) and under a 
condition where participants had knowledge that management had previously 
forecasted inaccurately (period two).  The independent variable for all four 
hypotheses is the tone of the communications. Tone is a between participant 
factor (high intention and no intention) in both period one and period two. In 
period one, tone is manipulated using the statement on internal control 
effectiveness by management. In period two, tone is manipulated using a letter 
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from management regarding actual earnings from period one. Four dependent 
variables are measured in this study. In period one there are two dependent 
variables; the rating of management’s credibility and participants’ reliance on 
management’s forecasts. In period two of the study the same two pieces of 
information are collected as in period one but the dependent variables are 
constructed as the difference between the measured variables in period one and 
period two. Therefore, the two dependent variables in period two are; 1) the 
difference in management’s credibility rating, and 2) the difference in reliance on 
management’s forecasts.   
Management’s credibility rating is measured using a previously validated 
18-question credibility scale (McCroskey and Teven 1999). In H1, the credibility 
scores between the two treatment groups (high intention statement on internal 
controls vs. no intention statement on internal controls) are compared. For H3, 
the difference in credibility ratings (credibility in period two less credibility in 
period one) between the two treatment groups (high intention earnings letter and 
no intention earnings letter) is compared.  
Participant reliance on management’s forecasts is a measure of the 
percentage change participants make in their forecasts after receiving 
management’s forecast. In H2 the percentage change in forecasts made by 
participants from before to after management’s forecast is compared between 
treatment groups (high intention statement on internal controls vs. no intention 
statement on internal controls). For H4 the variable measured is the difference in 
the percent change in forecasts made from period one to period two, which is 
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compared between treatment groups (high intention earnings letter and no 
intention earnings letter). 
3.3 Task 
An Internet-based laboratory experiment was conducted. The 
experimental materials resided on a local Web site. Participants signed up for 
scheduled experimental runs. A facilitator read the study’s instructions and 
provided each of the participants with a computer disk. The disk contained a 
hyperlink to the Web page, which randomized each participant into one of the 
four treatments in the study.  
The study’s task required participants to make earnings per share 
estimates after reviewing the background and financial statements of a selected 
company. Participants also rated management’s credibility using the McCroskey 
and Teven (1999) scale.  
The experimental task was adapted from prior research studies by Hirst et 
al. (1999) and Mercer (2005).  Task materials regarding the company, including 
company background, products, and financial statements were directly adapted 
from Mercer (2005). The task of predicting earnings per share was adapted from 
Hirst, et al. (1999).  Hirst, et al. (1999) used this task to study the joint effects of 
management’s prior forecast accuracy and the form of a financial forecast on 
participants’ judgments.  
.
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Table 1:  Overview of Steps in Study 
  1.  General instructions about the study 
  2.  Participant informed consent 
  3.  Introduction to task 
  4.  Study background information 
  5.  Company background information 
  6.  Overview of company products 
  7.  Internal control letter 
    a. High intention 
    b. No intention 
  8.  Financial statements (income statement and balance sheet) 
  9.  Participants provide initial earnings per share estimate for period one 
10. Participants are given management’s earnings per share estimate for period one 
11. Participants revise their earnings per share estimate for period one 
12. Participants complete the credibility rating for period one 
    a. Expertise factors 
    b. Intention factors 
    c. Trust factors 
13. Participants are given the financial results letter for period one (with actual  earnings per   
share) 
    a. High intention version of letter 
    b. No intention version of letter 
14. Company financial statements with period 1 actual results 
15. Participants provide initial earnings per share estimate for period 2. 
16. Participants are given management’s EPS prediction for period 2 
17. Participants revise their earnings per share estimate for period 2 
18. Participants complete the credibility ratings for period two 
    a. Expertise factors 
    b. Intention factors 
    c. Trust factors 
19. Participants answer manipulation check questions 
20. Participants answer  covariate questions – fraud 
21. Participants answer  covariate questions – Sarbanes-Oxley 
22. Participants answer demographic covariate questions 
23. Participants answer possible covariate questions – prior investing experience 
24. Participants answer theoretically derived covariate questions 
25. Participants are allowed to provide feedback regarding their experience 
26. Participants view the finished screen which thanks them for participating 
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Table 1 provides an overview of the steps of the task. A step by step 
progression of the study is presented in Appendix B with screen shots from the 
study, including descriptions of each step required of the participants. The steps 
referenced in this section refer to the corresponding steps in Table 1 
Before they began the task, the participants read general instructions 
(step 1) for the experiment and were given an informed consent form (step 2). 
After participants elected to participate in the study (the informed consent), they 
were given an introduction to the task and asked to assume the role of an 
investor evaluating the subject company (step 3). They were then given a short 
description of the company, its products, and the industry in which the company 
operates (steps 4-6). 
Participants were also given a management letter regarding the 
company’s internal controls over financial reporting pursuant to PCAOB Auditing 
Standard No. 2 (step 7).  Half of the participants received this letter in a manner 
that conveyed a message of high intention tone by management (step 7a). The 
other half of the participants received the required letter without the intention tone 
manipulation (step 7b). The participants then received three years of financial 
statement data (step 8). The balance sheets and income statements were 
identical for all treatment groups in stage one.  
Participants were told they were looking at this information as of January 1 
of the current year (period one). Once the participants had reviewed all of the 
background material about the company (steps 4-6), the internal control letter at 
either a high intention (step 7a) or no intention (step 7b), and the financial 
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statements (step 8), they were asked to predict the company’s earnings per 
share for the first year (step 9).  
The participants were then given management’s earnings per share 
forecast for period one (step 10). At this point in the study, none of the 
participants had any knowledge of management’s past forecast accuracy and 
were, therefore, in the no prior accuracy treatment. The prediction of earnings 
per share made by management was automatically generated based on the 
participant’s earnings per share prediction in step 9. The management forecast 
was 132 percent higher than the participant’s response from step 9. After 
receiving management’s forecast, participants were given a chance to adjust 
their prediction of earnings per share for period one (step 11). The adjustment 
made by participants is the dependent variable for H2, reliance on management 
forecasts. The participants then completed the credibility measurement 
instrument (step 12 a,b,c). The credibility measurement instrument is an 11-point 
Likert scale with 18 questions designed to measure the three factors of 
credibility: expertise (step 12a), intention (step 12b), and trustworthiness (step 
12c).  Credibility rating is the dependent variable for H1 in the study.  
The participants were given a letter from management (step 13) that 
notified participants of the actual results for the year (period one). Participants 
were told the difference between what management predicted and actual results. 
The letter stated that management failed to meet its prediction of earnings per 
share by 17 percent (109 percent of the participant’s earnings per share). The 
tone of the letter from management was determined by whether participants were 
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in the high intention (13a) or no intention (13b) tone-of-the-financial-letter 
treatment conditions.  One half of the participants received in the letter a 
statement that conveyed a message of high intentions by management (step 
13a). The other half of the participants received a letter that only stated the 
results for the year (period one) and the difference between what management 
predicted and actual results (step 13b).  
In the next stage of the study participants were given the financial income 
statement that included the actual results for period one (step 14). The income 
statement reflected the financial results the participants were told about in the 
management letter (see step 13a or 13b). The participants were then asked to 
make a prediction of earnings for the second year (period two) (step 15) for the 
same company. 
After making their earnings per share predictions for period two, 
participants were given management’s earnings per share prediction for period 
two (step 16). Management’s forecast was 132 percent higher than the prediction 
made by the participants. After receiving management’s estimate, participants 
were given an opportunity to revise their forecast for the second year (step 17). 
Participant’s revised forecast for year two was used to calculate the dependent 
variable for H4, difference in reliance on management’s forecast. After revising 
their forecasted earnings per share, participants were asked to complete the 
credibility measurement instrument for the second time (step 18a-c). The 
credibility rating in period two was used to calculate the dependent variable for 
H3, difference in credibility ratings.  
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After finishing the main part of the study, the participants answered 
several different types of questions including: manipulation check questions (step 
19), covariate questions regarding fraud (step 20), covariate questions regarding 
Sarbanes-Oxley (step 21), demographic questions (step 22), and other questions 
that were included in the study to identify possible covariates based on the 
participant’s past investing experiences (step 23) and theoretical models (step 
24).  Participants were also given a chance to provide feedback about the study 
(step 25). Finally, participants were thanked for participating in the study and 
asked not to discuss the study with others until they had been debriefed (step 
26).  
3.4 Participants 
 The participants for the main study are discussed in the Chapter 4. All 
participants for the pilot studies were students, and are discussed, respectively, 
with each pilot study.  
3.5 Measured Variables 
 This section describes each of the independent variables, dependent 
variables, and covariates that are captured and/or measured in this study.  
3.5.1  Independent Variables 
  The independent variables for this study are forecast accuracy and 
management’s tone in its letter to investors (participants).  These variables are 
discussed in the following sections. A third variable (surprise) will also be 
 37 
discussed, since it is theoretically important to the study; however, this variable is 
held constant in the study. 
3.5.1.1 Forecast Accuracy 
 Management’s forecast accuracy has been used as a proxy for 
management’s credibility (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999; Mercer 2001; Mercer 
2005). In this study management’s forecast accuracy was manipulated at two 
levels, no information and inaccurate information. In the no information condition 
none of the participants had knowledge of management’s prior accuracy. The no 
information condition occurs in period one of the task.  
The inaccurate condition in this study occurs in period two. In period two, 
all of the participants knew the earnings forecast from management in period one 
was inaccurate.  In prior studies, participants were only told that management 
had been accurate or inaccurate (Hirst et al. 1999). In this study, the participants 
are aware of management’s predictions in period one and the actual results of 
period one.    
A decision was made not to include a third level where participants know 
that management has been accurate in forecasting. Prior studies have found that 
when management’s prior accuracy is high investors perceive management’s 
credibility as high and few other variables can increase management’s credibility 
to a higher level (Hirst et al. 1999).7 The high accuracy variable level was 
purposefully omitted from the study to reduce the size and complexity of the 
study. 
                                                 
7 This finding may be the result of a ceiling effect. 
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3.5.1.2 Management’s Tone 
Management’s tone was manipulated at two different times during the 
study. There are two levels of management’s tone manipulation; one is a high 
intention tone and the second is a no intention tone. In the high intention 
treatments, the wording in the letters was consistent with management displaying 
the three sub-factors of the intention factor of credibility: understanding, empathy, 
and responsiveness toward participants. The letters can be seen in Appendix B 
(step 8 and 14).   
The first tone manipulation between groups occurred in the letter from 
management discussing the company’s internal controls over financial reporting, 
as required by the PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2. This letter was included with 
the company’s background and historical financial statements.  While the internal 
control letter is required by the PCAOB, the exact wording of the letter has been 
left to management. This study manipulates a single paragraph of this letter to 
convey a high intention or no intention tone to participants.  
The second tone manipulation is in the form of a letter from management 
disclosing the actual earnings of the company for the prior year (period one) of 
operations. Management’s tone is manipulated at two levels, high intention and 
no intention.  
3.5.1.3 Surprise 
Surprise measures the difference between participants initial expectation 
of earnings per share and management’s prediction of earnings per share. The 
amount of surprise was set to 32 percent above participants’ initial prediction for 
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all treatment conditions. To obtain a sufficient treatment effect, 32 percent was 
selected based upon the results of pilot test one. 
 Although the surprise variable is held constant across treatment 
conditions, it is an important variable in comparing this research model to prior 
studies. Past studies have used proxies to measure the market’s initial level of 
belief. In behavioral studies such as Hirst et al. (1999), participants were given 
analysts’ consensus estimates as an initial level of belief and then asked to make 
their estimates of earnings per share. While this method seems to give all 
participants a similar anchor, the participants still have some prior belief. The 
difference between participant’s prior level of belief and the anchor given to them 
cannot be measured in those studies. In this study, the participants gave their 
earnings per share estimate without being given any confounding anchors. The 
treatments for the remainder of the study were then based on the participant’s 
initial earnings per share estimates.  
Basing the treatments on the participant’s initial level of belief eliminates 
another type of potential bias.  Studies that use a constant dollar amount for 
surprise may introduce an unintended bias. If one participant’s initial level of 
belief is $1.00 and management’s estimate is $1.50 the surprise is $.50, which is 
a 50 percent increase over the initial level of belief.  Another participant may 
have an initial belief of $1.25 and when given management’s estimate of $1.50 
he/she only has a 20 percent increase over the initial level of belief. In an attempt 
to eliminate this bias, this study uses relative percentages, instead of incremental 
adjustments measured in dollars. 
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3.5.2  Dependent Variables 
 The dependent variables for this study are management’s credibility rating 
(H1), participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts (H2), the difference in 
credibility ratings from period one to period two (H3), and the difference in 
reliance on management’s forecast from period one to period two (H4).  Each of 
these variables is discussed below. Variables H1 and H3 are discussed first 
followed by H2 and H4.  
3.5.2.1 Management Credibility Rating (H1) 
 The first dependent variable captured in this study is management’s 
credibility rating. The credibility rating was measured using the McCroskey and 
Teven (1999) scale.  The scale is located in Appendix B (steps 12a,b,c & 
18a,b,c).  Eighteen questions are used in the scale to determine participants’ 
perception of management’s credibility. The scale measures credibility along 
three factors: (a) competence, (b) intention, and (c) trustworthiness. 
Management’s credibility rating is reported as the average of all 18 scale 
questions. 
3.5.2.2 The Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) 
Participants were asked to complete the credibility scale twice. The first 
time participants complete the scale is after revising their earnings per share 
forecasts in period one. Participants were also asked to complete the scale after 
revising their forecast in period two. The difference in credibility ratings measures 
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the difference between participants’ ratings of management’s credibility from 
period one to period two in the study.  
3.5.2.3 Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) 
 Reliance on management’s forecast measures the difference between the 
participants’ first earnings per share estimate and their revised earnings per 
share estimate after receiving management’s forecast.   
The participants are asked to forecast the earnings per share of the 
company in period one based on the background financial data about the 
company. They are then given management’s forecast of earnings per share for 
the same time period. Management’s forecast will always be 132 percent of the 
earnings prediction made by the participant.  Participants are provided a chance 
to modify their earnings per share estimate after receiving management’s 
forecast. 
Table 2, Panel A demonstrates the measurement of reliance on 
management’s forecast. To measure the participant’s reliance on management’s 
forecast, first the amount of surprise in management’s forecast is calculated. As 
stated above, all participants make a forecast for period one (EPS1) and receive 
a forecast from management (MEPS) that is 32 percent higher than the 
participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. Thus, all participants have a 
surprise of 32 percent of their initial forecast. Surprise is the denominator in the 
calculation of reliance. As can be seen in Table 2, Panel A, a participant with an 
initial earnings per share estimate of $2.00 is given information from 
management with $.64 of surprise ([MEPS- EPS1] or [$2.00 * .32]).   
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Table 2: Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) and Difference in Reliance on 
Management’s Forecasts Calculations (H4) 
Panel A: Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) as Measured by the Percentage 
Change in Earnings Per Share Estimate 
 
Revision EPS2 – EPS1 2.40  - 2.00 0.40 
Surprise 
= 
MEPS- EPS1 
= 
2.64 – 2.00 
= 
0.64 
= 63% 
           
Panel B: Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecasts (H4)  
 
Percentage Change in EPS Period One – Percentage Change in EPS Period Two* 
 63%    -  40%    
            
  Reliance dropped by 23%     
       
EPS1: Initial earnings per share estimate made by participant.  
EPS2: Revised earnings per share estimate made by participant  
MEPS: Management's estimate of earnings per share for period  
 * The reliance on management’s forecast for period two is calculated exactly as the 
reliance on management’s forecast for period one. H4 only uses the difference between the 
two reliance measures; no hypothesis was made for the reliance on management’s forecast 
in period two.  
 
Once the amount of management’s surprise is calculated, the amount of 
revision in the participant’s forecasts is calculated. The revision in a participant’s 
forecast is calculated by subtracting the initial earnings per share estimate 
(EPS1) from the revised earnings per share estimate (EPS2). For example, in 
Table 2, Panel A, the initial earnings per share estimate is $2.00 and the revised 
earnings per share estimate is $2.40. Thus, the revision in earnings per share is 
$.40.  
After the revision and the surprise have been calculated, the revision is 
divided by the surprise to determine what percentage of management’s new 
information was relied upon in revising the participant’s earnings forecast. In the 
example in Table 2, Panel A the revision of $.40 was divided by the surprise of 
$.64. In the example, the participant made a 63 percent adjustment to 
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management’s new information.  If the participant had revised his/her earnings 
per share estimates to $2.64, reliance on management’s forecast would have 
been 100 percent.  
3.5.2.4  Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4) 
To calculate the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4), 
the reliance on management’s forecast is measured twice in this study, once in 
period one and once in period two. So that reliance can be measured in period 
two, participants will be asked to give an earnings-per-share prediction for period 
two. As in period one, participants will be given management’s forecast of 
earnings per share for period two, which will again be 32 percent higher than 
participants’ estimates. After receiving management’s earnings per share 
forecast for period two, participants will be given a chance to modify their 
forecast. Panel A of Table 2 provided a demonstration of how the reliance on 
management’s forecast is calculated in period one. The reliance on 
management’s forecast in period two is calculated the same way. No hypotheses 
are given regarding the reliance on management’s forecast in period two, instead 
this study examines the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4) 
by subtracting the period one reliance measure from the period two reliance 
measure.  Panel B of Table 2 demonstrates this calculation using the numbers 
for period one as calculated in Panel A.  Assume in period two the participant 
had a reliance on management’s forecast of 40 percent. Therefore, the difference 
in reliance on management’s forecasts is 23 percent (63 percent – 40 percent). 
This signifies a 23 percent drop in reliance.  
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3.5.2.5  Covariates 
 Data about possible covariates were captured and tested. A thorough 
discussion of the covariates measured and tested in this study appears in 
Chapter 4. The task in this study required participants to review financial 
statements and forecast earnings per share estimates.  The covariates discussed 
in Chapter 4 include the participants’ prior experience with financial statements or 
forecasting, their level of investing activity, their background (major), and gender. 
Other possible covariates were theoretically derived from persuasion studies and 
are discussed in both Chapter 4 and Appendix A (O'Keefe 1990). 
3.6 Pilot Studies 
Before the main study was run, three separate pilot studies were 
conducted. Two pilot studies were used to design and test some of the 
experimental treatments used in the study. The third pilot test was conducted to 
test the overall research instrument and the effect of the treatments on the 
dependent variables.  
3.6.1  Pilot Study One 
The first pilot study was designed to test the level of surprise necessary to 
generate a sufficient size effect.  The pilot study was conducted using 19 
students enrolled in an accounting information systems course at a large 
southeastern university. Each participant was given four treatments which were 
comprised of different statements regarding differences between management 
and analysts’ forecasts. They were then asked to use a seven-point Likert scale 
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to rate the difference between analysts’ forecasts and management’s as to the 
significance of the difference and how surprising they found the difference. 
Neither significance nor surprise was defined for participants. Both terms 
(significant and surprising) were selected to determine how large management’s 
earnings per share estimate would have to be to create a perceived significant 
difference. Participants were asked if they felt the difference between 
management’s forecast and the analysts’ forecasts was significant and then were 
allowed to draw their own conclusion. Appendix C contains the complete 
questionnaire used in pilot study one.  
A decision was made to use analysts’ forecasts in the experimental 
materials because participants were not given background data regarding the 
company or financial statements. Additionally, it would not be feasible to tell the 
participants what their forecast was and use that as a proxy for their true beliefs. 
Instead, analysts’ forecasts were used to examine the amount of difference 
needed between a believable external forecast and management’s forecast.  
Management’s forecast varied between the four treatments as did the 
percentage of surprise (Table 3). Forecasts were set at four different dollar 
amounts with the surprise varying for each amount. The dollar amounts and the 
surprise are indicated in Table 3: 
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Table 3: Pilot Study One Surprise Analysis 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Percentage of 
Surprise 
Analyst 
Forecast Difference 
$1.23 10% $1.35 $0.12 
$1.55 20% $1.86 $0.31 
$1.75 30% $2.27 $0.53 
$1.10 40% $1.54 $0.44 
    
The dollar amount of management’s forecasts and the percentage of 
surprise were arbitrarily selected to determine an approximate percentage at 
which participants would feel there was a significant difference between 
management’s forecast and the analysts’ forecasts.  The amount of 
management’s forecast increases over the first three treatments, up to $1.75, 
and in the fourth treatment the amount of the forecast decreases to $1.10. This 
was done to examine whether the surprise was being generated by the dollar 
amount of the difference or by the percentage difference. 
 An ANOVA was performed to determine if the changes in the difference 
between management’s forecast and the analyst’s forecast had an effect on 
participants’ ratings of surprise and significance on the seven-point Likert scale. 
Overall, the change in percentage differences was significantly associated with 
surprise (F=11.52, two-tailed p =.001) and significance (F= 10.23, two-tailed p= 
.001). Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations of the surprise and 
significance questions for each of the treatments. 
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Table 4: Means and Standard Deviation for the Seven-point Likert Scale Ratings of 
Surprise and Significance 
Treatment N Surprise Mean (Standard Deviation)
Significance Mean (Standard 
Deviation) 
10% 19 3.263  (1.147) 4.368  (1.383) 
20% 19 4.000  (1.105) 5.526  (1.172) 
30% 19 5.526  (1.218) 6.368  (0.831) 
40% 19 4.947  (1.615) 5.894  (1.197) 
Scale end points were 1 = Insignificant to 7 = Significant 
    
A Scheffe’s test was used to determine if there was a significant difference 
between the treatment groups.  For the significance variable, the 10 percent 
group was significantly different from all other treatments.  No other significant 
differences were found.  For the surprise variable, there were no significant 
differences among groups.  The lack of significant differences among treatment 
groups may have been due to the design of the instrument. The 40 percent 
treatment resulted in a lower dollar difference than the 30 percent treatment. 
Therefore, the results were re-computed eliminating the 40 percent treatment. In 
this analysis, the 30 percent treatment was significantly different from the 
remaining two groups for both measures. 
After consideration of the results of this pilot study, 32 percent 8 was 
selected as the difference between participants’ initial forecast and 
management’s forecast for the main pilot study (pilot study 3).   
                                                 
8 Although 30% was the amount tested, 32% was used to limit participant’s ability to guess that 
management’s forecast was a percentage of theirs. If participants predicted an even number like 
$1.00, they may figure out by period two that management’s prediction is exactly 30% larger. 
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For the purposes of this study it was important to have surprise between 
management’s forecast and participants’ prior expectations. There is no correct 
amount of surprise. All of the participants in the main study got the same 
percentage of surprise. The difference between treatments was examined using 
a percentage calculation of change.  
3.6.2 Pilot Study Two 
The second pilot study was conducted to examine the power of the tone 
manipulations on participants’ ratings of management’s intention factor of 
credibility. As previously discussed, there are two separate tone manipulations in 
the study, each at two levels. One of the tone manipulations occurs in 
management’s statement about the company’s internal controls, as mandated by 
the PCAOB Standard No. 2.  The second tone manipulation occurs in a letter 
from management discussing the disappointing results from the prior year (period 
one).  
 Twenty-one students were given management’s internal control letter and 
a letter from management stating the prior year’s financial results. They were 
also given the six questions from the credibility scale measuring perceived 
intention (Appendix B, step 13b). There were two versions of each letter, one 
with a high intention tone and one with no intention tone. Each student received 
only a single instance of each letter. For example, a single student could have 
received an internal control letter with the high intention tone and a financial 
 49 
results letter with the no intention tone. There were four possible groups and the 
order in which students were assigned to each group was random.9   
 For the internal control letter credibility ratings a MANOVA was conducted 
using the six credibility rating questions as the dependent variables and the tone 
manipulation as the independent variable. An overall MANOVA F-test indicated a 
significant difference in the rating of management’s credibility between 
participants in the high intention tone and no intention tone groups (F=3.73; two-
tailed p= .020). Not all six of the questions measuring perceived intention were 
significant. A breakdown of the individual ANOVA results for each question is 
presented in Panel A of Table 5. The two items measuring perceived intentions 
that were not statistically significant were self-centered and understanding.  
 For the earnings results letter credibility ratings a MANOVA was 
conducted using the six credibility rating questions as the dependent variables 
and the tone manipulation as the independent variable. An overall MANOVA F-
test indicated no significant difference in the ratings of management’s credibility 
between participants in the high intention and no intention tone groups (F=.84; 
two-tailed p=.556).  All six items were insignificant when analyzed using 
ANOVAs. The results are presented in Panel B of Table 5.  
The overall results of the second pilot study indicated that the right wording 
in a letter from management could influence participants’ perceptions and ratings 
of management’s credibility. With respect to the earnings letter, the manipulation 
                                                 
9 The order the letters were presented was not random because the order of these letters cannot 
be randomized in the main study.  All participants receive the internal control letter before 
receiving the financial results letter. 
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was not sufficiently strong, or was not important to participants, as there was no 
statistically significant difference between the two groups. Before the main pilot 
study was conducted, the wording of the earnings letter was revised. Both the 
high intention tone and no intention tone earnings letters were lengthened10. 
                                                 
10 Ph.D. students were asked to analyze the letters used in pilot study two and to make 
recommendations for increasing the impact of the letters.  
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Table 5: Comparison of Statistics for Management’s Internal Control Letter and Earnings Letter   
Panel A: MANOVA Results of the Management Internal Control Letter on Six Intention Questions (Wilks’ Lambda 0.384; MANOVA 
F=3.73; p=.020) 
 High Intention Treatment No Intention Treatment  
Upper Bound (1) Lower Bound (11) Mean (standard deviation) Mean (standard deviation) F  Stat P-value 
Cares about me Doesn’t care about me 4.818 (1.078) 3.600 (1.429) 4.92 0.039 
Has my interest at heart Does not have my interest at heart. 4.727 (0.904) 3.400 (1.712) 5.07 0.036 
Not self-centered Self-centered 4.545 (1.128) 3.800 (1.229) 2.10 0.163 
Concerned with me Unconcerned with me 5.272 (0.646) 3.700 (1.337) 12.14 0.003 
Sensitive Insensitive 5.181 (0.603) 4.400 (1.699) 7.57 0.013 
Understanding Not Understanding 5.181 (0.751) 4.800 (0.788) 1.29 0.270 
      
Panel B: MANOVA Results of the Earnings Results Letter on Six Intention Questions (Wilks’ Lambda 0.734; MANOVA F=.84; p=.556) 
      
  High Intention Treatment No Intention Treatment  
Upper Bound (1) Lower Bound (11) Mean (standard deviation) Mean (standard deviation) F Stat  P-value 
Cares about me Doesn’t care about me 4.181 (1.887) 3.900 (1.524) 0.14 0.713 
Has my interest at heart Does not have my interest at heart. 4.272 (1.272) 4.000 (1.633) 0.18 0.673 
Not self-centered Self-centered 4.363 (1.362) 4.400 (1.712) 0.00 0.957 
Concerned with me Unconcerned with me 4.727 (1.737) 4.000 (1.764) 0.09 0.354 
Sensitive Insensitive 4.454 (1.293) 4.400 (1.265) 0.01 0.923 
Understanding Not Understanding 4.818 (1.28) 4.300 (1.159) 0.90 0.355 
    
* All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc. …”
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3.6.3 Main Pilot Study   
 A third pilot study was conducted to test the overall effectiveness of the 
research instrument and to test the main effects of the treatments on the 
dependent variables. Student participants enrolled in the study online and 
completed the task at their own pace via the Internet.  Originally, 33 usable 
responses were tested.11 Participants were solicited from two accounting 
classes. One of the classes had participated in the second pilot study. 
Participants from this class previously read the letters. There is a possibility that 
the students in this class did not re-read the letters, as they may have believed 
they already knew what the letters said.  Their responses were a potential threat 
to the internal validity of the study. Data for participants who had previously 
participated in the second pilot study were removed and 19 overall responses 
were used to analyze the pilot data.  Students who were retained in the study 
were senior level accounting students enrolled in an Auditing II course. 
 In the main pilot study, participants were asked to pretend they were 
members of an investment club. They were given background information about 
a fictitious company. Included in this information was the internal control letter 
(manipulated at two levels: high intention tone and no intention tone) and 
financial data for the last three years, including the earnings per share 
information. Participants were asked to estimate earnings per share for the 
coming year (period one). Participants were then given management’s earnings 
per share estimate for the same period (set at 132 percent of the participant’s 
                                                 
11 Two responses were eliminated because of missing or incomplete information. Several 
students lost connection of the host Web site but re-started the instrument and completed it in full. 
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initial prediction) and then were given an opportunity to alter their original 
estimate. After completing the earnings per share estimate, participants 
completed the credibility scale.  
 In the second part of the main pilot study, participants were notified of the 
actual earnings per share for period one. Notification came in the form of a letter 
from management that was also manipulated at two levels (high intention and no 
intention). Participants were notified that management had failed to meet its 
forecast. The amount of difference between actual earnings per share in period 
one and management’s prediction was held as a constant percentage of 
management’s prediction (equivalently stated as 109 percent of the participants’ 
original estimate or approximately 17.4 percent less than management’s initial 
estimate).  Thus, although the absolute dollar amount of difference between 
management’s forecast and the actual results varied between participants, the 
percentage difference remained constant.  
 Participants were again presented with the financial statements, including 
the most recent year’s performance. They were asked to estimate earnings per 
share. Participants were given management’s prediction of earnings per share 
for the year (period two) (132 percent of their estimate) and given the opportunity 
to revise their forecast. Participants then completed the credibility instrument as 
well as manipulation check questions and demographic questions. Appendix B 
contains screen shots of the experiment as it was presented to the participants. 
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3.6.3.1 Main Pilot Study Data Analysis 
 The data collected in the pilot study were analyzed to determine if the 
treatments (the letters) had an effect on participants’ judgments. The main study 
is based on four hypotheses. Recall that H1 and H2 predict that users who are 
given communications from management with the high intention tone will rate 
management’s credibility higher and have more reliance on management’s 
forecasts. In period two, H3 and H4 predict that communications from 
management with the high intention tone can mitigate other losses of credibility. 
In the main study this was measured as the difference in credibility ratings from 
period one to period two and as the difference in reliance on management 
forecasts from period one to period two. For the pilot study only participant’s 
ratings of credibility and their adjustment of earnings per share for period two 
were compared between groups. 
 The pilot study was designed to test the effect of the treatments; however, 
due to the small sample size, statistically significant results were not expected in 
all treatments. Instead the strength and direction of the difference in means 
between treatments was analyzed. The main effects results from the pilot study 
are presented in Table 6 and Table 7. 
Only the six questions that measure the intention factor of credibility were 
analyzed for both letters. While overall management credibility is important, the 
model already lacks statistical power, adding twelve more questions/variables to 
test the impact of the letters on the expertise and trustworthy variables would 
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lower the statistical power of the analysis.12 Also, the intention factor of credibility 
is the primary factor that is manipulated in the study; whereas, the expertise and 
trustworthy factors are not manipulated. 
3.6.3.2 The Effects of the Internal Control Letter Manipulation 
 For the first year’s ratings and predictions, the overall model was tested 
using the tone of the internal control letter participants received as the 
independent variable, the six intention factor of credibility questions and the 
percentage change in earnings per share estimates as the dependent variables. 
The model was significant (F=5.31, two-tailed p= .008) as seen on Table 6 Panel 
A.  
As Table 6 Panel B shows, three of the intention questions are statistically 
significant (cares about me [F=4.25, one-tailed p= .027], concerned with me 
[F=4.42, one-tailed p= .025]), and has my interest at heart [F=2.51, one-tailed p= 
.066]. The other three questions were found to be insignificant (not self centered 
[F=.300, one-tailed p= .294], sensitive [F=.12, one-tailed p= .368], and 
understanding [F=.01, one-tailed p= .454]). Interestingly, the three insignificant 
variables were the only three questions on the instrument that were reverse 
coded. It is possible that participants failed to read the questions carefully.  
.
                                                 
12 Overall credibility is composed of the three major factors of credibility (intention, expertise, and 
trustworthiness) as measured by the 18 questions on the credibility scale. Each major factor is 
measured by 6 of the 18 questions.  
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Table 6: Main Pilot Study Results for Sarbanes-Oxley Internal Control Letter   
Panel A: Overall Significance of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter: Wilks’ Lambda =.234, F= 5.31, p=.008 
    
Panel B: Impact of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter on Intention Factor of Credibility Ratings 
    
Question Description* High Intention  Tone  (N=10) 
No Intention Tone 
(N=9)   
More Credibility (1) Less Credibility (11) 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Mean 
(standard deviation) F Statistic  P-value*** 
Cares about me Doesn’t care about me 5.200 (1.398) 6.777 (1.92) 4.25 .027 
Has my interest at heart 
Does not have my interest 
at heart. 5.500 (2.461) 7.111 (1.922) 2.51 .066 
Not self-centered Self-centered 6.900 (2.182) 6.333 (2.291)    .30 .294 
Concerned with me Unconcerned with me 5.500 (1.841) 7.222 (1.716) 4.42 .025 
Sensitive Insensitive 5.400 (1.646) 5.666 (1.732)   .12 .368 
Understanding Not Understanding 5.100 (1.449) 5.000 (2.179)    .01 .454 
    
Panel C: Impact of Sarbanes Oxley Internal Control Letter on Percentage Change in Calculation 
     
 High Intention Tone (N=10) 
No Intention Tone 
(N=9)   
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) F Statistic  P-value *** 
Y1PERDIF**  .550 (.443) .287 (.320) 2.22 .077 
      
*All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc” 
** Y1PERDIF: Measures the percentage change in adjustment toward management’s forecast.  
*** Two tailed p-values 
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 The reliance on management’s forecast was calculated as demonstrated 
in Table 2 and was compared between the two treatment groups. Table 6 Panel 
C, shows that participants in the high intention condition relied more on 
management’s estimates. The mean percentage adjustment for participants in 
the high intention condition was .550 compared to .287 for participants in the no 
intention condition. The percentage of difference between means was statistically 
significant (F=2.22, two-tailed p= .077) and in the direction expected. 
3.6.3.3 The Effect of the Earnings Letter Manipulation  
 The second part of the pilot study sought to lower management’s 
credibility by having management fail to meet the forecast from period one.  The 
study sought to determine whether a high intention tone letter from management 
to shareholders could mitigate the loss of credibility as measured by the 
difference in credibility ratings and by the difference in participants’ reliance on 
management’s forecast. All participants were given a forecast from management 
in period one that was inaccurate. In this part of the study, the number of 
possible treatments has now doubled and the power of the statistical tests is 
further reduced. Approximately 3-6 participants were in each treatment cell. 
Table 7 presents the results of the earnings letter manipulation. 
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Table 7: The Results of the Main Pilot Study for the Earnings Results Letter   
Panel A: Overall Significance of Earnings Results Letter: Wilks’ Lambda =.791, F= .053, p=.772 
    
Panel B: Impact of Earnings Results Letter on Intention Factor of Credibility Ratings 
    
Question Description* High Intention  Tone  (N=10) No Intention Tone (N=9)   
More Credibility (1) Less Credibility (11) 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Mean 
(standard deviation) F Statistic  P-value 
Cares about me Doesn’t care about me 6.375 (1.767) 6.182 (1.834) .05 .821 
Has my interest at heart 
Does not have my interest 
at heart. 6.000 (2.000) 6.818 (2.088) .74 .403 
Not self-centered Self-centered 6.750 (2.251) 6.364 (2.292) .13 .719 
Concerned with me Unconcerned with me 6.000 (2.449) 6.272 (1.794) .08 .782 
Sensitive Insensitive 5.875 (1.642) 5.364 (2.292) .29 .598 
Understanding Not Understanding 5.500 (1.069) 5.273 (2.240) .07 .795 
    
Panel C: Impact of Earnings Results Letter on Percentage Change in Calculation 
     
 High Intention Tone (N=10) No Intention Tone (N=9)   
Variable 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) F Statistic  P-value 
Y2PERAJDF**  .260 (.457) .058 (.188) 1.77 .201 
      
*All questions begin with the phrase “I believe that management of MBMC, Inc” 
** Y2PERADJ: Measures the percentage change in adjustment toward management’s forecast.  
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 Table 7 Panel A presents the results of a MANOVA test on the earnings 
letter manipulation. There was no overall significance found (F=.053, two-tailed 
p=.772) when the main effect of the earnings letter treatment was tested against 
the six intention factors of credibility and the adjustment of earnings per share 
estimates. All six-intention factors of credibility were statistically insignificant 
(cares about me [F=.05, two-tailed p= .821], has my interest at heart [F=.74, two-
tailed p= .403], not self centered [F=.13, two-tailed p= .719], concerned with me 
F=.08, two-tailed p= .782], sensitive [F=.29, two-tailed p= .598], and 
understanding [F=.07, two-tailed p= .795]).  
Table 7 Panel C presents the results of testing the impact of the earnings 
letter on the participants’ adjustment of earnings per share. This was also 
insignificant (F=1.77, two-tailed p= .201); however, the means were in the 
predicted direction, suggesting that participants in the high intention treatment 
revised their earnings per share closer to management’s predictions. As shown 
in Table 7 Panel C, the mean adjustment, stated as a percentage between 
participants’ initial prediction and management’s prediction, was 26 percent for 
the high intention treatment and 5.8 percent for the no intention treatment.  
3.6.3.4 Comparison of Earnings Per Share Adjustments Between Groups  
To compare the degree to which perceived credibility decreased between 
period one and period two the difference in intention ratings and adjustments of 
earnings per share were compared between treatment groups. In making the 
comparison, two new dependent variables were calculated and analyzed from 
the collected data. These variables measure the difference of adjustment in 
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earnings per share estimates in period one and period two and the difference in 
the intention factor of credibility ratings in period one and period two.  
The first new variable is the difference between the average intention 
ratings from period one and the average intention ratings from period two. The 
six questions measuring the intention factor of credibility were summed and 
averaged for each period. Period two average ratings were then subtracted from 
the period one average ratings. For this variable, lower values indicate the 
intention factor of credibility dropped more in period two (less credibility). Panel A 
of Table 8 shows the mean ratings for period one and period two and the 
difference between them. As indicated in Panel A, participants who received the 
high intention earnings letter lowered management’s credibility more (-1.88) than 
participants who received the no intention financial results letter (-.045).   
The second new variable measures reliance on management’s forecast as 
the difference between the percentage adjustment in earnings per share for 
period one and period two. Table 2 demonstrated how this variable is calculated.  
Panel B of Table 8 compares the mean loss of credibility for the percentage 
change loss of credibility from period one to period two. Consistent with the 
predicted findings, participants who received the high intention tone earnings 
letter perceived less loss of credibility (.213) than participants who received the 
no intention financial results letter (.332).  
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Table 8: Reduction in Credibility Between Periods One and Two  
Panel A: Decrease in the Intention Factor of Credibility from Period One to Period Two 
       
   Change in Intention Factor of Credibility by Treatment 
Treatment Condition N 
Mean Period 
One Rating 
Mean Period 
Two Rating 
Mean Loss 
of Credibility 
Standard 
Deviation 
High Intention Letter 8 5.900 6.083 -.188 1.18 
No Intention Letter 11 6.000 6.045 -.045 0.98 
       
Panel B: Decrease in Percentage Change of Earnings Per Share Estimates From Period 
One to Period Two 
       
   Percentage Change Loss by Treatment 
Treatment Condition N 
Mean Period 
One % 
Adjustment 
Mean Period 
Two % 
Adjustment 
Mean Loss 
of Credibility 
Standard 
Deviation 
High Intention Letter 8 .473 .260 .213 .431 
No Intention Letter 11 .390 .058 .332 .421 
      
 
3.6.3.5 Main Pilot Study Conclusions 
While the results of the main pilot study do not offer significant statistical 
relationships, the power of the statistical tests performed was low. Low power 
increases the possibility of a Type II error. Overall, the results of the pilot study 
were encouraging in that many of the manipulations seemed to be influencing the 
dependent variables in the hypothesized direction.  
Several other factors could also lead to the non-significant findings of this 
pilot study. First the position of the credibility instrument in the study may have 
been too far removed from the letter manipulations in both treatments. In the pilot 
study, participants read the letter (the treatment) then read the financial 
statements, made their earnings per share estimates, read management’s 
earnings per share predictions, and then revised their forecasts before 
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completing the credibility questions. For the main study this instrument was 
moved up so that participants completed the credibility scale directly after 
reading the letters. 
Another significant factor that may have impacted the results of the pilot 
study was the way in which the study was administered. Participants were able to 
participate in the study at their leisure and in the location they selected. Some 
participants may have had extraneous activities interfering with their attention to 
the study and its subtle manipulations.  The only variable available to give an 
estimate of effort while taking the study is the time it took participants to complete 
the study. This is a noisy variable in that someone who takes a long time to 
complete the study may not have given any more effort to reading and answering 
the questions than someone who took a short time. People or things around 
participants could distract them from the study for a few minutes. In an effort to 
help control these extraneous variables, the main study was conducted in a 
supervised setting. The participants completed the study in a computer lab with a 
proctor administering the study.  
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4.0 Main Study Results 
4.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter, I present the results of the main study. The task used in 
the study was presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the main study’s participants. Next the manipulation checks 
employed to ascertain the salience of the treatments to the participants are 
discussed. After discussing the manipulation checks, an analysis of potential 
covariates is presented. Following analysis of covariates, the hypotheses that 
were presented in Chapter 2 are statistically tested and analyzed. Using the 
results of the data analyses, each of the hypotheses is examined and discussed 
in detail.  
4.2 Participants 
One hundred and twenty-four graduate level students participated in the 
study. The participants were recruited from a large southeastern university.  The 
recruitment pool consisted of graduate students enrolled either in a Masters of 
Business Administration (MBA) program, Masters of Accountancy (M.Acc.) 
program or post-undergraduate accounting students who were completing a fifth 
year of course work for professional certification.  Forty-five MBA students and 
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79 accounting students13 participated in the main study. There were 71 female 
participants and 53 male participants. The participants had an average of 1.65 
years of work experience in the field of accounting. 
During the semester, all of the participants were enrolled in an accounting 
course that required them to either participate in one of several available 
research projects or write a paper assigned by their instructor. In addition to class 
credit, participants who enrolled in this study were paid $10. 
The participants in this study represented an appropriate pool to test the 
research hypotheses since graduate business students have been found to be a 
reasonable proxy for investors (Copeland et al. 1973; Ashton and Kramer 1980; 
Walters-York and Curatola 1998; ,2000; Libby et al. 2002). Also, this study 
focused on the judgment of investors and relied only on general cognitive 
abilities. As discussed in Libby et al. (2002), students are a suitable participant 
pool when general cognitive abilities are required. This study only looks at the 
relative differences between participants’ responses by treatment group. 
4.3 Manipulation Checks 
Several manipulation check questions were included in the study to 
determine if the participants perceived the treatments given to them.  The 
manipulation check questions will be discussed below.  
                                                 
13 A breakdown between M.Acc. students and the other accounting students was not made as 
students in the M.Acc. program were also enrolled in the fifth year accounting course. 
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4.3.1  Intention Manipulation 
No manipulation check was analyzed with respect to the intention 
manipulation.  As discussed below, there were questions included in the study 
that attempted to test if participant’s perceived the intention of the 
communications that they were given.  
Written communication was used to deliver the credibility treatment 
between the groups in period one and period two. In period one, participants 
received the statement of internal controls from management with either the high 
intention tone or the no intention tone treatment. In period two, participants 
received the letter from management informing them of the actual results for 
period one, again with either a high intention tone or no intention tone treatment.  
The intention factor of credibility is composed of three sub-factors: 
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness. An attempt was made to 
determine if the participants perceived the letters as understanding, empathetic, 
and responsive.  For each period, participants answered three questions rating 
management on the three sub-factors of the intention factor of credibility. The 
manipulation check questions can be seen in Appendix B, item 19.  
The six manipulation check questions (three per period) dealing with the 
three factors of credibility were not analyzed for this study. It was decided post 
hoc that the credibility scale would be a better determinant than the manipulation 
questions in determining if the participants perceived the letters as credible. The 
purpose of the manipulation check questions was to test if the participants 
remembered the treatment to which they were exposed. These manipulation 
questions asked participants to rate the credibility of the letters they received, but 
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did not ask about the actual wording of any of the letters. All three of the 
manipulation questions were highly correlated with the credibility factors and 
seemed to measure the same construct as credibility, which is already measured 
by the credibility scale used in this study (Cronbach’s = .768). McCroskey and 
Tevens’ (1999) credibility scale is a validated instrument, while the questions 
used as manipulation checks have not been validated.  Better manipulation 
check questions could have asked the participants questions about the specific 
wording in the letters they received such as, “Did management meet with focus 
groups of shareholders because there was a directive from the board of 
directors?” This type of question would have determined if the participants 
actively recalled the specific treatments.  
4.3.2  Surprise  
Two manipulation questions were given to participants to determine if they 
were surprised by the amount of management’s forecast. One question was used 
for each of management’s forecasts. The questions were answered using a 
seven-point Likert scale with answers ranging from “Lower than I expected” to 
“Much more than I expected.” All but two of the participants seemed somewhat 
surprised by management’s forecast. These participants rated the surprise of 
management’s period one forecast as less than a four on the seven-point scale. 
The period one analysis was conducted with and without these two participants  
 67 
 
and no material differences were found in the results. Based on these findings 
the reported results retain the two participants.  
Surprise was tested for the second period forecast in the same manner as 
for period one. In period two, only one participant rated management’s forecast 
as less than four on the seven-point scale. The analysis was conducted both with 
and without the three participants who failed the manipulation check (two from 
period one and one from period two) and there was no impact on the results of 
the study.  
4.3.3  Accuracy 
One question was used as a manipulation check to determine whether 
participants had perceived management’s period one forecast as accurate. The 
question used a seven-point Likert scale and asked participants if management’s 
forecast for period one was accurate (1) to inaccurate (7).  Management’s 
forecasts in the study were inaccurate and it was expected that participants 
would rate management low on the accuracy scale. Six participants rated 
management’s accuracy in its period one forecast below four on the seven-point 
scale. Three participants answered the accuracy question with a rating of two 
while three others had a rating of three. The reported results for period one’s 
analyses and period two’s analyses were tested without these six responses and 
no material differences were found.   
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4.3.4  Manipulation Check Summary 
 As indicated, it was determined that removing the participants who failed 
manipulation check questions did not significantly add to the explanatory power 
of the model. By keeping all of the participant responses a balanced design was 
achieved, which increased the power of the statistical methods employed in the 
data analysis.  
4.4 Data Analysis 
4.4.1  Introduction 
 This section begins with an explanation of the selection of covariates 
included in the study. Following the discussion of the covariates, each of the 
hypotheses will be discussed and statistically tested. Included in the write-up 
about hypotheses testing is a description of the type of analysis used to test each 
hypothesis.  
4.4.2  Covariates 
This study was designed to manipulate and measure management’s 
perceived credibility by altering the tone of a written communication from 
management. Management’s credibility was also manipulated in the study by 
having management fail to meet a forecast. These manipulations were 
purposeful and controlled in the experiment. There are, however, other factors 
that can impact perceptions of management’s credibility or the impact that 
perceptions of management’s credibility will have on decision making. While 
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these factors are important, not all of them can be manipulated and randomized 
between participants. Some of these factors are unique to each individual in the 
study. It is important to identify and measure factors that are associated with 
individual participants that may impact their assessment of management’s 
credibility or the impact that management’s credibility has on their decision 
making. In statistical terms, these factors are called covariates.  
Good covariates will help explain some of the variation in the dependent 
variables without removing any of the power of the model. Generally, good 
covariates are highly correlated with the dependent variable but not with 
independent variables. If the covariates are correlated with independent variables 
they reduce the ability to measure the true impact of the independent variables 
on the dependent variable. All covariates in this study were selected by first 
testing a correlated relationship between the covariate and the dependent 
variable. As the models are developed and tested, these covariates are further 
scrutinized with regard to their relationship to the dependent variables. In the 
case of the credibility rating variable, the potential covariates were tested 
individually against the three sub-factors of the credibility variable. The sub-
factors were used to ensure that no potential covariates were omitted at a higher 
level of analysis since the credibility construct is analyzed by the three sub-
factors in the post hoc analysis section. 
Three types of possible covariates were measured and tested in this 
study: demographic, theoretical, and recent events covariates. Covariates were 
first tested by using a correlation analysis testing each covariate with the 
 70 
 
respective dependent variables. An alpha of .10 was used as the significance 
level in the correlation analysis. Once the covariates with a significant correlation 
to the dependent variable were identified, a preliminary ANCOVA model was 
tested using the covariates and the appropriate independent variable. The 
following sections detail the testing of the different classifications of possible 
covariates used in this study.   
4.4.2.1  Demographic Covariates 
Demographic information was captured about each participant. Capturing 
demographic information allows testing to determine if there were systematic 
differences between similar groups of people participating in the study. The 
demographic questions tested as covariates in this study are presented in Table 
9 and include gender, accounting experience, and years of work experience. 
Gender was selected as a possible covariate because prior research has found 
significant differences between males and females in stock market investing 
tasks (Barber and Odean 2001). This study makes no directional predictions as 
to the impact of gender on the task results. Accounting experience and years of 
work experience were selected as covariates due to the nature of the task. There 
was a potential for participants with more accounting and work experience to 
recognize differences between their experience with disclosures from 
management and those presented within the task in the study.   
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Table 9: Demographic Covariate Questions   
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format  
Variable  Question Response 
Gender What is your gender? Male=1/Female=0 
Accounting 
Experience Have you worked in the field of accounting? Yes=1/No=0 
Years of 
Experience 
In total, how many years have you worked in the field of 
accounting? (Numeric Response) 
   
Panel B: Demographic Covariates Descriptive Data 
Variable N Mean     
Gender 124 0.427     
Accounting Experience 124 0.508     
Years of Experience 63 3.253     
       
Panel C: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients (p-values**) 
Variable*  
Credibility Rating 
 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Difference in 
Credibility Ratings 
Difference in 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Gender -0.177 (0.050) -0.093 (0.307) 0.063 (0.486) -0.102 (0.258) 
Accounting 
Experience  0.109 (0.227) -0.014 (0.876) 0.136 (0.132) 0.081 (0.369) 
Years of 
Experience -0.085 (0.509) -0.015 (0.904) -0.028 (0.823) -0.030 (0.816) 
* See Panel A for a description of the variables 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel A identifies the demographic questions asked and Panel B provides 
descriptive data for the demographic covariate questions.  Approximately 43 
percent of the participants were males (53) and about 57 percent were females 
(71). Slightly over 50 percent of the participants had previous accounting 
experience (63), resulting in a mean of about 3.25 years of experience per 
participant with experience.  
As shown in Table 9 Panel C, only the gender variable was found to be 
significantly correlated (p = .050) with any of the dependent variables. The 
gender variable was correlated with credibility rating. 
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4.4.2.2  Theoretical Covariates 
There are several factors that are theoretically tied to credibility ratings 
and the impact credibility plays in decision making. These variables are 
discussed in detail in Appendix A, but will be briefly reviewed here as they relate 
to the covariates in the study. The theoretical factors to consider are the 
participants’ level of involvement with the task, the timing in identifying the 
communicator, the advocated position of the message, and the perception of 
possible knowledge and reporting biases.  
4.4.2.3  Level of Involvement  
Based on the theoretical model discussed in Appendix A, a participant’s 
level of involvement with the task should not impact his/her ratings of 
management’s credibility but should have an impact on the reliance on 
management’s forecasts. Participant’s level of involvement could be an important 
factor in the findings of this study so nine questions were asked to determine 
participants’ level of involvement with the study (Table 10, Panel A). Participants 
who were more involved in the stock market might be more involved in the task.  
Panel B and Panel C of Table 10 present the descriptive statistics for the 
level of involvement questions. As can be seen in Table 10, 54 percent (67) of 
participants had made investments (PREVIOUSLY INVESTED) in the stock 
market, while 88 percent (100) plan (PLAN TO INVEST) to invest in the stock 
market (some of the participants who indicated they had invested in the stock 
market also plan to invest in the stock market). When asked on a five-point scale 
if they would pick their own stocks (SELF SELECT STOCKS) rather than have a 
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broker select them, the group responses indicated that participants would pick 
their own stocks with a mean of around 3.68, more than they would rely on a 
broker to pick their stocks (BROKER), with a mean around 2.53.  Participants 
were also asked if they had previously performed a task similar to the one in the 
study (TASK EXPERIENCE). Of the 124 participants, most had not performed a 
task similar to the one in the study (mean 2.60). Most participants seemed to 
enjoy the task (TASK ENJOYMENT) as they rated their mean enjoyment at 
about 3.8, which was close to the “agree” end of the response scale. They also 
seemed to have some confidence in their earnings per share estimates 
(CONFIDENCE) as they rated the confidence question with a mean of about 3.5, 
falling just between the “neutral” and “agree” points on the response scale.  
Panel D of Table 10 presents the correlations between the level of 
involvement questions and the dependent variables. Several of the level of 
involvement questions were correlated with the credibility rating variables and 
were further tested as covariates. Questions relating to participant’s investing 
behavior were highly correlated with the credibility rating. The following variables 
were significantly correlated with the credibility rating: PREVIOUSLY INVESTED, 
SELF SELECT STOCKS, INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND, TASK ENJOYMENT, 
and CONFIDENCE. PREVIOUSLY INVESTED and CONFIDENCE were also 
significantly correlated with reliance on management’s forecast in period one.  
Only INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND was significantly correlated with the 
difference in credibility ratings from period one to period two. The difference in 
reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to period two was 
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significantly correlated with only one level of involvement question— 
PREVIOUSLY INVESTED. 
 
Table 10: Level of Involvement with Task Questions   
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format  
Variable  Question Response  
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED Have you ever made an investment in the stock market? Y=1/N=0 
PLAN TO 
INVEST Do you plan to invest in the stock market? Y=1/N=0 
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL 
FUND Have you ever invested in a mutual fund? Y=1/N=0 
SELF 
SELECT 
STOCKS I pick which stocks I want to purchase. [SA,A,N,D,SD]
BROKER I rely on my broker to tell me which stocks to purchase. [SA,A,N,D,SD]
MUTUAL 
FUNDS ONLY I only invest in mutual funds [SA,A,N,D,SD]
TASK 
EXPERIENCE 
I have previously performed tasks similar to the one in this 
study. [SA,A,N,D,SD]
TASK 
ENJOYMENT I enjoyed working on the task in this study. [SA,A,N,D,SD]
CONFIDENCE I am confident in my earnings per share predictions. [SA,A,N,D,SD]
Key: [SA,A,N,D,SD] = Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4), Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly 
Disagree (1)  
 
Panel B: Covariate Descriptive Data for Dichotomous Variables 
Variable N Mean    
Previously 
Invested 124 0.540    
Plan to Invest 124 0.880    
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL FUND 124 0.557    
      
Panel C: Covariate Descriptive Data for Ordinal Variables 
Variable N Mean* Standard  Deviation Minimum Maximum 
SELF SELECT 
STOCKS 124 3.685 1.054 1 5 
BROKER 124 2.532 1.070 1 5 
TASK 
EXPERIENCE 124 2.604 1.254 1 5 
TASK 
ENJOYMENT 124 3.823 0.744 2 5 
CONFIDENCE 124 3.508 0.791 1 5 
* See Panel A for scale values for each variable. 
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Table 10: Level of Involvement with Task Questions (Continued) 
Panel D: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for Covariates and Dependent Variables (p-
values**)  
Variable* 
Credibility 
Rating 
 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Difference in 
Credibility 
Ratings 
Difference in 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Previously 
Invested -0.187 (0.037) 0.165 (0.068) 0.038 (0.676) 0.190 (0.035)
Plan to Invest 0.025 (0.786) -0.009 (0.923) 0.070 (0.435) 0.112 (0.214)
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL 
FUND -0.212 (0.018) 0.116 (0.199) -0.268 (0.003) 0.119 (0.190)
SELF SELECT 
STOCKS -0.173 (0.055) -0.003 (0.974) 0.015 (0.866) 
-
0.013 (0.888)
BROKER 0.056 (0.538) -0.007 (0.937) 0.003 (0.971) 0.093 (0.306)
MUTUAL 
FUNDS ONLY 0.127 (0.159) -0.004 (0.966) 0.048 (0.595) 
-
0.118 (0.191)
TASK 
EXPERIENCE -0.143 (0.114) 0.003 (0.978) -0.007 (0.936) 
-
0.039 (0.671)
TASK 
ENJOYMENT 0.221 (0.014) -0.117 (0.195) 0.032 (0.718) 
-
0.031 (0.731)
CONFIDENCE 0.165 (0.067) -0.154 (0.089) 0.029 (0.745) 
-
0.075 (0.408)
    
* See Panel A for a  description of the variables 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
 
4.4.2.4  Timing in Identifying the Communicator Covariate 
 The model in Appendix A reveals that for people receiving a message, 
timing in identifying who a communicator is can impact the role of credibility in 
decision making. Timing in this sense refers to when a person is notified of the 
sender of a message, which can either be before or after the message has been 
given. In this study, all recipients were given communications from management 
and all recipients were told the communication was from management. Two 
questions were given to participants to test if they were aware that management 
was responsible for the communications in this study. Consistent with the theory, 
since all participants were told the identity of their communicators before 
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receiving the message, the responses to this question were uncorrelated with 
any of the dependent variables.  
4.4.2.5  The Advocated Position of the Message 
Another factor discussed in Appendix A is the position of the message. 
Communicators can either give a message that is in the same direction as their 
audiences’ beliefs or in an opposite direction. The participant’s initial forecast of 
earnings per share was used to compare the position of the message given by 
management to the participants’ beliefs about future earnings. Participants who 
forecasted positive earnings per share (n= 114) over the prior period were tested 
against those who forecasted negative earnings per share (n= 10) using a bi-
variate dummy variable. Since almost all (92 percent) of the participants 
forecasted positive earnings per share over the initial prior period the results of 
the comparison were insignificant.  
4.4.2.6  Knowledge Bias and Reporting Bias 
The message delivered by any communicator will interact with the 
message recipient’s expectations of the message. Knowledge bias and reporting 
bias refer to two such interactions that have been found in prior literature (Eagly 
and Wood, 1978).  While these two topics are covered in detail in Appendix A, a 
brief review will be given here to clarify how these interactions were tested. It is 
also important to note that testing for these effects occurred near the end of the 
study after the treatments were given; therefore, the questions had no impact on 
the main treatments, thus eliminating the possibility of confounding the results of 
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the main experiment with the manipulation check questions. Unfortunately, 
asking the questions at the end of the study limited the scope of the questions. 
A knowledge bias would occur if the message recipient believed the 
communicator’s background or education would pre-dispose the communicator 
to advocating only one side or perspective of an issue.  It would be confirmed if 
the message delivered by the communicator was consistent with the recipient’s 
pre-message expectations. A confirmed knowledge bias can reduce credibility 
via the expertise factor of credibility while a disconfirmed knowledge bias can 
increase perceived credibility via the expertise factor of credibility. For example, 
more weight is given to a politician who gives an opinion opposite that of his 
political party’s message. The message recipients are expecting the politician to 
take a position in line with the politician’s party. If the politician takes the 
expected position, he/she can lose credibility with the message recipients (unless 
the message takes the same position held by the recipient, then credibility means 
less to the decision).   
A reporting bias is also an expectation from the message recipient. The 
expectation is formed based on the intended audience of the communication. 
That is, a recipient believes the communicator will alter the message to conform 
to the beliefs of the intended audience. When a reporting bias is confirmed, the 
trustworthiness factor of credibility is reduced. When a reporting bias is 
disconfirmed, the trustworthiness factor of credibility is enhanced. 
Three questions were used to determine if reporting or knowledge biases 
were present in the study. The three questions used to test for reporting and 
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knowledge biases do not allow differentiation between which bias may be 
present. This study was not designed to test the impact of these biases; the 
check is being used to test a possible covariate that may help remove some of 
the effects of these biases, thus isolating the impact on the main treatments.  
Table 11, Panel A presents the three questions used to test the 
knowledge bias and reporting bias in the study. It was important to determine the 
expectations of the participants with regard to what management reports. The 
first question asked if participants expected management to correctly report its 
earnings estimates while the other two questions both tried to determine if 
participants expected management to inflate its earnings estimates and if they 
expected those estimates to be positively inflated.  
The descriptive data for the reporting and knowledge bias questions are 
presented in Panel B of Table 11. Regarding their expectations about 
management reporting earnings correctly, participants were somewhat neutral in 
their response with a mean score slightly less than 3.26. They did, however, 
have a higher mean (about 3.53) with respect to the belief that management 
would inflate its earnings predictions. At an even higher level of agreement, 
(approximately 4.22) participants indicated that management would predict 
positive earnings.  
Panel C of Table 11 presents the correlation data between the reporting 
and knowledge bias questions and the dependent variables. The question asking 
participants if they expected management to inflate its earnings estimates 
(EXPECT MANAGEMENT TO INFLATE EPS) was the only variable that was 
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correlated with any of the dependent variables. This variable was correlated with 
both reliance on management’s forecast (H2), and the difference in reliance on 
management’s forecasts (H4) from period one to period two.   
Table 11: Reporting Bias and Knowledge Bias Questions 
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format   
TRUST MANAGEMENT 
Managers in public companies are most likely to report 
earnings estimates correctly. [VL,L,N,U,VU] 
EXPECT MANAGEMENT 
TO INFLATE EPS 
I expected management to inflate their earnings 
predictions. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
EXPECT POSITIVE 
EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENTS I expected management to predict positive earnings. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
Key:   
[SA,A,N,D,SD] =  Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4), Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly Disagree (1) 
[VL,L,N,U,VU] = Very Likely (5), Likely (4), Neutral (3), Unlikely (2), Very Unlikely (1) 
 
Panel B: Covariate Descriptive Data 
Variable N Mean* 
Standard  
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
TRUST MANAGEMENT 124 3.258 0.927 1 5 
EXPECT MANAGEMENT 
TO INFLATE EPS 124 3.532 1.199 1 5 
EXPECT POSITIVE 
EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 124 4.218 0.704 2 5 
 
* See Panel A for scale values for each variable.  
Panel C: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
(p-values) 
Variable* 
Credibility 
Rating 
 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Difference in 
Credibility 
Ratings 
Difference in 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
TRUST MANAGEMENT 0.130 (0.149) -0.020 
   
(0.822) 0.067 (0.461) -0.033 (0.714) 
EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT TO 
INFLATE EPS 
-
0.127 (0.159) -0.282 (0.002) -.034 (0.706) -0.220 (0.014) 
EXPECT POSITIVE 
EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 0.109 (0.230) -0.146 (0.105) 0.035 (0.702) -0.002 (0.984) 
         
* See panel A for a description of the variables.  
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
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4.4.2.7  Recent Event Covariates 
The final group of variables tested as covariates related to recent events 
that had occurred in the financial markets and the reaction of lawmakers to those 
events (Sarbanes-Oxley). The exposure of participants to high profile financial 
frauds such as Enron and WorldCom could impact participant responses.  
Twelve questions were used to develop an understanding of each 
participant’s exposure to and understanding of the recent events regarding 
management fraud and the government reaction to those recent frauds (i.e., the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). The recent event questions are presented in Table 
12, Panel A.  Eight of the 12 questions deal with fraud and four questions deal 
with participant’s knowledge of and beliefs about the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.   
Table 12, Panel B and Panel C presents descriptive data regarding the 
recent event questions. Participants were asked if they believed management 
fraud was prevalent (FRAUD IS PREVALENT), and their responses seem to 
indicate a bit of indecision with respect to the issue. Just over half of the 
participants about .51 responded that they believed management fraud is 
prevalent. Seemingly in agreement, when participants were asked if they would 
rely on a forecast from management (TRUST MANAGEMENT FORECAST) the 
mean response was a neutral 3 on a scale of 1 to 5. Participants were then 
asked if they would rely on a forecast from management if an independent 
auditor provided assurance on those forecasts (AUDIT ASSURANCE OF 
FORECASTS). The results were a bit more positive for the effect of auditor 
assurance, as the mean response to the auditor question was around 3.55.  
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Of the 124 participants, 5.6 percent (7) indicated they had been defrauded 
as a shareholder of a public company (PERSONAL FRAUD HISTORY), but 22.6 
percent (28) of participants knew someone who had been defrauded 
(ACQUAINTANCE FRAUD HISTORY) and 79.8 percent (99) had heard of 
someone being defrauded by a public company (HEARD ABOUT FRAUD). 
Surprisingly, 1.6 percent (2) of the participants responded that they have 
committed fraud in a public company (FRAUDSTER)14.  
With respect to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act recent event questions the 
participants were asked if they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (STUDIED 
SOX). They responded with a mean score around 4.45 indicating somewhere 
between “agree” and “strongly agree” that they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. The participants also felt that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP) was between “relevant” and “very relevant” with respect to 
fraud (mean about 4.37).  The last two questions asked participants if they were 
familiar with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY) and if they were familiar with Auditing Standard No. 2 as issued 
by the PCAOB (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY). The results for these two questions were 
somewhat consistent as participants were close to “agree” that they knew about 
the PCAOB (mean about 3.82), and they were between “neutral” and “agree” on 
the question regarding their familiarity with the Auditing Standard No. 2 
promulgation, with a mean rating of 3.54.  
                                                 
14 Both of these participant’s responses to other questions were checked to determine if they 
were not taking the study seriously. Based on the time they spent on questions before and after 
this question it did appear the participants at least took a reasonable amount of time to answer 
these questions.  
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Panel D of Table 12 presents the correlations between the recent events 
covariates and the dependent variables. The recent event covariates could be 
split into two sections, recent events regarding management fraud and the 
events that transpired in reaction to those events (e.g., the passage of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act). Only one of the questions associated with management 
and fraud was significantly correlated with any of the dependent variables, while 
all four of the Sarbanes-Oxley questions were correlated with at least one of the 
dependent variables. The fraud question that asked if the participant had been 
defrauded as a shareholder of a public company was significantly correlated with 
the credibility rating. For the Sarbanes-Oxley questions, the question asking 
participants if they had studied the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in their accounting 
courses was correlated with the difference in management’s credibility ratings 
from period one to period two. The question asking the importance of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was significantly correlated with the credibility rating and the 
reliance on management’s forecast. The questions asking students about their 
familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2 and the PCAOB were also significantly 
correlated with the credibility rating variable. 
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Table 12: Recent Event Questions    
Panel A: Variable Names, Questions and Response Format  
Variable Question Response 
FRAUD IS 
PREVALENT Do you believe management fraud is prevalent? Y=1/N=0 
PERSONAL 
FRAUD 
HISTORY 
Have you ever been defrauded as a shareholder of a 
public company? Y=1/N=0 
ACQUAINTANCE 
FRAUD 
HISTORY 
Do you know of someone who has been defrauded 
by a public company? Y=1/N=0 
HEARD ABOUT 
FRAUD 
Have you ever heard of someone who was 
defrauded by a public company? Y=1/N=0 
FRAUDSTER 
Have you ever committed fraud as a member of 
management? Y=1/N=0 
TRUST 
MANAGEMENT 
FORECASTS 
I trust management in providing me with foreword 
looking forecasts. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
AUDIT 
ASSURANCE OF 
FORECAST 
I would rely on management’s forward looking 
forecasts if an independent auditor provided 
assurance on management’s assertions. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
STUDIED SOX 
I have studied Sarbanes-Oxley in my accounting 
courses. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP With regard to fraud, I believe Sarbanes-Oxley is: [VR,R,N,I,VI] 
ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY 
I am familiar with the requirements of PCAOB 
Auditing Standard No. 2, "An Audit of Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction 
with an Audit of Financial Statements." [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY I know what the PCAOB is. [SA,A,N,D,SD] 
Key:   
[SA,A,N,D,SD] =   Strongly Agree (5), Agree (4),Neutral (3), Disagree (2), Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
[VR,R,N,I,VI] =Very Relevant (5), Relevant (4),Neutral (3), Irrelevant (2), Very Irrelevant (1) 
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Table 12: Recent Event Questions (Continued) 
Panel B: Recent Event Covariates Descriptive Data for Dichotomous Covariate 
Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard  Deviation    
FRAUD IS 
PREVALENT 124 0.508 0.502  
PERSONAL 
FRAUD HISTORY 124 0.056 0.232  
ACQUAINTANCE 
FRAUD HISTORY 124 0.226 0.420  
HEARD ABOUT 
FRAUD 124 0.798 0.403  
FRAUDSTER 124 0.016 0.126  
   
Panel C: Recent Event Covariates Descriptive Data for Ordinal Covariate Variables 
Variable N Mean Standard  Deviation  Min Max
TRUST 
MANAGEMENT 
FORECASTS 124 3.000 0.855  1 4 
AUDIT 
ASSURANCE OF 
FORECAST 124 3.548 0.868  2 5 
STUDIED SOX 124 4.452 0.780  1 5 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 124 4.371 0.643  2 5 
ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY 124 3.540 1.340  1 5 
PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY 124 3.823 1.437  1 5 
   
* See Panel A for scale values for each variable. 
 85 
 
 
Table 12: Recent Event Questions (Continued) 
Panel D: Covariate Correlations with Dependent Variables Using Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients (p-values**) 
Variable* 
Credibility 
Rating 
 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Difference in 
Credibility 
Ratings 
Difference in 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
FRAUD IS 
PREVALENT 0.048 (0.598) 0.014 (0.879) 0.099 (0.274) 0.018 (0.846)
PERSONAL 
FRAUD 
HISTORY -0.187 (0.038) 0.051 (0.575) -0.054 (0.549) 0.055 (0.546)
ACQUAINTANCE 
FRAUD 
HISTORY 0.016 (0.860) 0.069 (0.449) 0.040 (0.657) 0.112 (0.215)
HEARD ABOUT 
FRAUD -0.072 (0.424) -0.010 (0.910) 0.045 (0.616) 0.043 (0.636)
FRAUDSTER 0.026 (0.774) -0.122 (0.179) 0.093 (0.300) -0.117 (0.198)
TRUST 
MANAGEMENT 
FORECASTS 0.007 (0.939) 0.115 (0.204) -0.144 (0.109) 0.106 (0.243)
AUDIT 
ASSURANCE OF 
FORECAST 0.138 (0.128) -0.041 (0.651) -0.052 (0.566) -0.004 (0.968)
STUDIED SOX 0.129 (0.152) -0.044 (0.627) -0.186 (0.038) -0.051 (0.575)
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 0.260 (0.004) -0.159 (0.078) 0.024 (0.791) -0.048 (0.597)
ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY 0.283 (0.001) 0.075 (0.406) 0.042 (0.643) 0.101 (0.267)
PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY 0.200 (0.026) 0.033 (0.715) -0.003 (0.970) 0.101 (0.264)
* All participants had read about a fraud being committed.  
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
4.4.2.8 Summary of Covariate Findings 
The results of the covariate testing found several variables correlated with 
the dependent variables in this study. This section contains a brief discussion of 
the covariates included in the model used to test the hypotheses. The discussion 
relates each covariate to the dependent variables with which they were 
correlated.   
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4.4.2.8.1 Covariates Correlated with Credibility Rating (H1) 
The covariates that were correlated with the credibility rating (H1) were 
determined by testing each potential covariate’s correlation with the credibility 
rating from period one of the study.  Table 13 summarizes the correlated 
covariates with credibility rating by type of covariate.  
Table 13: Covariates Correlated with Credibility Rating (H1)  
Variable* Correlation P-Value** Type of Covariate Reference Table 
Gender -0.177 0.050 Demographic Table 9 
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED -0.187 0.037 Level of Involvement Table 10 
SELF SELECT 
STOCKS -0.173 0.055 Level of Involvement Table 10 
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL FUND -0.212 0.018 Level of Involvement Table 10 
TASK 
ENJOYMENT 0.221 0.014 Level of Involvement Table 10 
CONFIDENCE 0.165 0.067 Level of Involvement Table 10 
PERSONAL 
FRAUD 
HISTORY -0.187 0.038 Recent Events Table 12 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 0.260 0.004 Recent Events Table 12 
PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY 0.200 0.026 Recent Events Table 12 
ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY 0.283 0.001 Recent Events Table 12 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.  
  
Once the significantly correlated variables were identified they were 
further tested for inclusion in the final model by running a preliminary ANCOVA 
analysis. This analysis included the independent variable tone of management 
letter (Internal Control Letter) used to test H1 as well as all of the identified 
covariates. Using an alpha of .10, only four of the correlated variables were 
significant in the model as presented in Table 14. Participants’ prior history with 
investing in mutual funds (INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND) (F=3.53, two-tailed p= 
.063), their confidence in their earnings per share estimates (CONFIDENCE) (F = 
 87 
 
5.82, two-tailed p= .018), their familiarity with Sarbanes-Oxley (FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP) (F = 9.47, two-tailed p= .002), and their familiarity with Auditing 
Standard No. 2 (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY), (F=2.97, two-tailed p= .087) were 
included in the final model used to test H1.  
Table 14: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Credibility Rating (H1) Using Covariates 
Variable* DF Sum of Squares Mean Squares F Statistic P-Value** 
Internal Control 
Letter 1 10.755 10.755 7.15 0.009 
PERSONAL 
FRAUD 
HISTORY 1 1.845 1.845 1.23 0.270 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 1 14.246 14.246 9.47 0.002 
PCAOB 
FAMILIARITY 1 2.177 2.177 1.45 0.231 
ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY 1 4.472 4.472 2.97 0.087 
Gender 1 1.327 1.327 0.88 0.350 
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED 1 2.981 2.981 1.98 0.162 
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL FUND 1 5.305 5.305 3.53 0.063 
SELF SELECT 
STOCKS 1 3.587 3.587 2.38 0.125 
TASK 
ENJOYMENT 1 1.707 1.707 1.13 0.289 
CONFIDENCE 1 8.753 8.753 5.82 0.018 
      
Model 11 84.858 7.714 5.13 0.0001 
Error 112 168.430 1.503   
Corrected Total 123 253.289    
      
n = 124      
*See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
4.4.2.8.2  Covariates Correlated with Reliance on Management’s Forecasts  
The four variables correlated with the participants’ reliance on 
management’s forecasts are presented in Table 15. The covariates were further 
tested against the reliance on management’s forecasts by running a preliminary 
ANCOVA analysis. As Table 16 demonstrates, all four of the potential covariates 
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were significant using an alpha of .10. Consequently, all four covariates are used 
in the hypothesis testing. 
Table 15: Covariates Correlated with Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2)  
Variable* Correlation P-Value** Type of Covariate 
Reference 
Table 
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED 0.165 0.068 Level of Involvement Table 10 
CONFIDENCE -0.154 0.089 Level of Involvement Table 10 
EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT 
INFLATE EPS -0.282 0.002
Reporting and Knowledge 
Bias Table 11 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP -0.159 0.078 Recent Events Table 12 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.  
 
 
 
Table 16: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) 
Using Covariates 
Variable DF Sum of Squares Mean Squares F Statistic P-Value** 
Internal Control 
Letter 1 0.031 0.031 4.27 0.041 
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 1 0.046 0.046 6.31 0.013 
CONFIDENCE 1 0.050 0.050 6.88 0.010 
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED 1 0.025 0.025 3.39 0.067 
EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT 
INFLATE EPS 1 0.071 0.071 9.71 0.002 
      
Model 5 0.214 0.042 5.86 <0.000 
Error 118 0.862 0.007   
Corrected Total 123 1.077    
*See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions. 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
4.4.2.8.3 Covariate for the Difference in Credibility Ratings  
 H3 measures the difference in credibility ratings from period one to period 
two by examining the difference in participants’ ratings of management’s 
credibility on the McCroskey and Teven (1999) credibility scale. Table 17 shows 
that only two of the potential covariates were correlated with the difference in 
credibility ratings. 
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Table 17: Covariates Correlated with the Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) 
 
Variable* Correlation P-Value** Type of Covariate Reference Table 
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL 
FUND 0.271 0.002 Level of Involvement Table 10 
STUDIED 
SOX -0.186 0.039 Recent Events Table 12 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.  
  
A preliminary ANCOVA was run using both the independent variable and 
both of the significantly correlated covariates. The results presented in Table 18 
show that both the participants’ mutual fund investing experience (F = 9.06, two-
tailed p= .032) and their studying of Sarbanes-Oxley (F = 4.17, two-tailed p= 
.043) were significant (alpha = .10) variables in the model. Thus, both covariates 
are included in the tests of H3. 
Table 18: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing of Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) Using 
Covariates 
Variable* DF Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value** 
FINANCIAL 
RESULTS LETTER 1 3.866 3.866 2.66 0.105 
INVESTED IN 
MUTUAL FUND 1 13.149 13.149 9.06 0.032 
STUDIED SOX 1 6.059 6.059 4.17 0.043 
      
Model 3 24.147 8.049 5.55 0.0013 
Error 120 174.160 1.451   
Corrected Total 123 205.486    
*See tables 9-12 for descriptive statistics of the variables 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
 
 
4.4.2.8.4 Covariates for the Difference in Reliance on Management’s 
Forecasts (H4) 
In this study, the difference in reliance on management forecasts (H4) is 
measured as the difference between the reliance on management’s earnings per 
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share estimates made in period one and the reliance on management’s earnings 
per share estimates in period two. To control for the residual experimental effects 
of period one in this study, a variable was created to measure the usefulness of 
management’s prediction in period one15. The useful variable was measured as 
the difference between the participants’ final earnings per share prediction in 
period one and the actual results of earnings per share in period one. High 
(positive) values of the useful variable indicate that participants’ final estimates of 
earnings per share were above the actual earnings per share for the period. Low 
(negative) values of the useful variable indicate that the participants’ final 
estimates of earnings per share were below the actual earnings per share for 
period one.  For example if a participant selected $2.00 as his/her initial earnings 
per share estimate, management would predict earnings per share for the period 
of $2.64. The surprise in management’s prediction is $.64. On average 
participants in the high intention tone treatment revised their earnings per share 
estimates about 33 percent of the surprise in management’s forecast. So this 
participant would have adjusted their earnings per share estimate to $2.21 ($2.00 
initial prediction plus 33 percent of the $.64 surprise). Actual earnings per share 
for this participant’s example would be 1.09 percent of the initial earnings per 
share or $2.18 ($2.00 * 1.09). The useful measure for this example would be 
$.03 as the participant’s estimate was $.03 higher than the actual earnings per 
share. In period two this participant was less likely to rely on management’s 
forecast than someone with a negative useful score.  This was seen in 
correlation testing where the useful variable was highly correlated in a negative 
                                                 
15 See the discussion in the post hoc analysis section as well as in the studies limitations. 
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direction with the difference in reliance on management forecasts variable.  The 
higher the useful variable the less reliance on management’s forecast in period 
two.  
Table 19 below presents the actual useful calculations based on the 
period one treatment conditions. As can be seen from the table, participants in 
the high intention condition had a mean revised earnings per share estimate of 
about $2.21, while participants in the no intention treatment condition had a 
mean revised estimate of earnings per share of around $2.11.  The mean actual 
earnings per share for the high intention group was just over $2.17, while the 
actual earnings per share for the no intention group was about $2.15. After 
rounding, the usefulness of management’s forecast was $.04 for participants in 
the high intention treatment while it was $- .04 for participants in the no intention 
treatment condition.  
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Table 19: Calculation of the Useful Covariate by Period One Treatment Condition 
Participants’ Period 
One Revised 
EPS Estimate 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Period One Actual 
Earnings Per Share 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Usefulness of Period 
One EPS Estimate ** 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Treatment 
Condition 
(Period One) 
    
$ 2.206 (.264) $ 2.173 (.125) $.037 (2.11) High 
Intention $1.550 – $2.870 $1.635 – $2.452 $-.616 – $.185 
     
$ 2.113 (.279) $ 2.148 (.230) $-.038 (.153) No Intention 
$.500 – $2.600 $.545 – $2.398 $-.429 – $.189 
* Calculated as Participant’s Initial Earnings Per Share * 1. 09 
** Calculated as Actual Period One EPS – Participant’s Revised Period One EPS Estimate 
 
 
Table 20 presents the descriptive statistics for the useful variable based 
on the period two treatment conditions. Participants’ who received the high 
intention tone financial statement letter had a positive difference (mean =.026) 
between their earnings per share estimates in period one and actual earnings per 
share. The positive difference is indicative of estimating earnings per share 
above the actual earnings per share for the period. The participants who received 
the no intention tone financial statement letter had a negative difference (mean = 
-.024) between their earnings per share estimates in period one and the actual 
period one results. The negative difference indicates that the participants had 
underestimated actual earnings per share. This relationship between the 
usefulness of period one’s forecast and the amount of difference in reliance on 
management’s forecasts in period two is further examined in the post hoc 
analysis. 
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics for the Useful Covariate by Year Two Treatment  
 High Intention Letter No Intention Letter 
Covariate 
Mean  
(Standard Dev) Min Max 
Mean 
 (Standard Dev) Min Max 
Useful* 0.026 (0.177) -0.616 0.189 -0.024 (0.195) -.494 0.190
       
* The useful variable measured the difference between participants’ second earnings per share 
estimate in period one and the actual period one earnings per share for the company 
 
As can be seen in Table 21, the new variable, useful, was found to be a 
significantly correlated with the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts 
(H4). In addition to the useful covariate, two other potential covariates were found 
to be significantly correlated with the dependent variable at an alpha of .05. The 
variable that measured participants’ belief that management would inflate its 
earnings, along with the question asking if participants planned to invest in the 
stock market.  
Table 21: Covariates Correlated with the Difference in Reliance on Management 
Forecasts (H4) 
Variable* Correlation P-Value** Type of Covariate 
Reference 
Table 
Useful -0.788 0.000
Control Variable for Period 
One Table 19 
EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT 
INFLATE EPS -0.220 0.014
Reporting and Knowledge 
Bias 
Table 11 
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED 0.190 0.035 Level of Involvement Table 10 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests.  
  
The results of a preliminary ANCOVA test are presented in Table 22. An 
ANCOVA was used to examine the covariates in relationship to the dependent 
variable while controlling for the relationship to the independent variable. Only 
the useful variable was significant (F = 177.65, two-tailed p< .000), using an 
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alpha of .10.  The two other potential covariates were insignificant and will not be 
included in the final testing of the hypothesis.  
Table 22: Preliminary ANCOVA Testing Difference in Reliance on Management 
Forecasts (H4) Using Covariates 
Variable* DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value** 
Financial Results Letter 1 0.036 0.040 1.3 0.257
Previously Invested 1 0.033 0.032 1.08 0.301
Expect Management 
Inflate EPS 1 0.004 0.003 0.12 0.733
Useful 1 5.416 5.412 177.65 0.000
  
Model 4 6.133 1.533 50.29 0.000
Error 119 3.628 0.030    
Corrected Total 123 9.761     
* See tables 9-12 for variable descriptions 
** P-Values are two-tailed tests. 
4.4.3 MANCOVA Testing 
The dependent variables in this study are examined to determine if they 
are correlated.  When using multiple dependent variables that are correlated the 
MANCOVA model is used to determine the main and interaction effects of the 
independent variables to the combined dependent variables. Table 23 presents 
the results of the correlation analysis on the dependent variables. There are two 
dependent variables for both periods of the study. In period one the dependent 
variables are management’s credibility rating and the participants’ reliance on 
management’s forecast. As can be seen in Panel A of Table 23, these two 
dependent variables are correlated (Pearson -.195, p = .029) indicating that using 
a MANCOVA model is appropriate. 
In period two there are also two dependent variables. The first dependent 
variable is the change in credibility ratings and the second dependent variable is 
the change in reliance on management’s forecasts. As can be seen in Panel B of 
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Table 23, these two dependent variables are not correlated, and therefore are 
not examined using a MANCOVA model.  
Table 23: Correlation Between Dependent Variables by Period 
Panel A: Correlation Between Period One Dependent Variables 
Variable Correlation P-Value 
Credibility Rating (H1) & Reliance on Management’s  
Forecast (H2) -.195 .029
  
Panel B: Correlation Between Period Two Dependent Variables 
Variable Correlation P-Value 
Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) & Difference in 
Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4) -.014 .873
  
  
Table 24 Panel A presents the results of the MANCOVA model examining 
the significance of the internal control letter on both dependent variables from 
period one. As the table shows, the F statistic is significant for the internal control 
letter (Wilks’ Lambda .899, F = 6.46, P= .002). Since the intention factor is 
significant in the MANCOVA it is appropriate to conduct a separate ANCOVA 
analysis for each dependent variable.  Panels B and C of Table 24 present the 
separate ANCOVA models for each of the dependent variables.  
In Panel B of Table 24 the impact of the internal control letter on credibility 
rating is significant (F = .7.19, two-tailed p = .008). Those covariates that are 
significant (p=.10) will be retained for the analysis of H1.  
As can bee seen in  Panel C of Table 24, the impact of the internal control 
letter on the reliance on management’s forecast is also significant (F = 3.19, two-
tailed p = .077). Again, those covariates that are significant (P=.10) will be 
retained for the analysis of H2. 
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Table 24: Results for Internal Control Letter’s Impact on Credibility Ratings and 
Reliance on Management’s Forecast 
Panel A: MANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Credibility Ratings & 
Reliance on Management’s Forecast  
Wilks’ Lambda .899, F Statistic = 6.46, P = .002 
 
Panel B: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Credibility Rating 
Variable DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value* 
Internal Control Letter 1 11.033 11.033 7.19 .008
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP 1 17.145 17.145 11.17 .001
CONFIDENCE 1 8.126 8.126 5.29 .023
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY 1 5.916 5.916 3.85 .052
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 1 4.662 4.662 3.04 .084
Previously Invested 1 9.037 9.037 5.89 .016
Expect Management Inflate 
EPS 1 4.184 4.184 2.73 .102
  
Model 7 75.191 10.741 7.0 <.000
Error 116 178.097 1.535   
Corrected Total 123 253.289       
    
Panel C: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter on Reliance on Management’s 
Forecast 
Variable DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value* 
Internal Control Letter 1 .227 .227 3.19 .077
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP 1 .538 .538 7.56 .007
CONFIDENCE 1 .503 .503 7.06 .009
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY 1 .097 .097 1.35 .247
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 1 .071 .071 .99 .321
Previously Invested 1 .125 .125 1.76 .188
Expect Management Inflate EPS 1 .722 .722 10.14 .002
  
Model 7 2.255 .322 4.52 <.000
Error 116 8.262 .071   
Corrected Total 123 10.518    
    
Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone. 
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud. 
CONFIDENCE: Asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share predictions. 
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY: Asked participants about their familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2. 
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Asked participants if they had invested in mutual funds. 
Previously Invested: Asked participants if they had previously invested in the stock market. 
Expect Management Inflate EPS: Asked if they expected management to inflate earnings. 
 *P-Values are all two-tailed tests   
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4.4.4  Statistical Assumptions Testing 
Since the overall MANCOVA model was significant, the analysis 
proceeded with ANCOVA models for testing the hypothesis for each dependent 
variable. As a first step, the statistical assumptions associated with ANCOVA 
were evaluated. Therefore, in this section the statistical assumptions regarding 
each of the dependent variables are tested and discussed. Although different 
statistical methods may be used to analyze each of the hypotheses, most of the 
multivariate procedures have similar assumptions regarding the dependent 
variables. After examining whether there are violations of any of the assumptions 
underlying the statistical procedure for each hypothesis, the hypotheses will be 
discussed and tested.   
 ANCOVA tests are most appropriate when looking for main and interaction 
effects of a categorical independent variable and covariates on a dependent 
variable. There are three assumptions that should be met for the ANCOVA 
procedure: 1) each observation should be independent, 2) the dependent 
variables should follow a normal distribution, and 3) the variances between the 
groups should be equal (Hair et al. 1998). The accuracy of the ANCOVA 
procedure is also sensitive to data that is not representative of the sample 
population (outliers) (Hair et al. 1998).  
 This section proceeds as follows. Each of the assumptions are discussed 
and tested for each of the dependent variables in the model. A discussion of the 
assumption of independent observations is next followed by a discussion of the 
tests of normality, heteroscedasticity, and outliers.  
 98 
 
4.4.4.1 Independent Observations 
With respect to the assumption of independent observations, all 
participants in this study were randomly assigned to one of the treatments. No 
participants were allowed to participate in this study more than once and all 
participants worked individually. Therefore, each observation is independent of 
all others. 
4.4.4.2 Multivariate Normality 
Several methods were used to test if the dependent variables followed a 
normal distribution. Box and whisker plots and normal probability plots were used 
to graphically analyze the data. Normal probability plots allow a visual inspection 
of the data against a theoretically normal distribution pattern. Statistical methods 
measuring the skewness and kurtosis of the data were also examined for each 
dependent variable. Reported kurtosis numbers indicate the peak of the 
distribution, while skewness numbers indicate if the observations fall 
disproportionately to the left or the right of the distribution.  Two statistical tests 
were also used to determine if a variable is normally distributed. The 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and the Anderson-Darling statistics both test if data come 
from a normal distribution.   
With respect to the credibility rating (H1), normal probability plots indicated 
the data were slightly skewed to the right, which was consistent with the 
skewness statistic of .43. The kurtosis statistic was -.369, which was represented 
in a graph as a higher peak around the midpoint of the data. The graphical 
results were consistent with the Anderson-Darling (p=.012) statistic but not the 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p= .133) statistics. While the plots seemed to indicate the 
data were not normally distributed, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test failed to find 
non-normality in the data set.  
In testing for normality in the reliance on management forecast variable 
(H2), normal probability plots, a histogram and box and whisker plots indicated 
the reliance on management forecast data were positively skewed (skewness 
.96), with an overall low peak or very mild kurtosis (.13). Consistent with the 
graphical observations, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p=.010) and Anderson-Darling 
(p=.005) tests indicated the data were not normally distributed. 
An examination of the difference in credibility ratings (H3) variable for 
normality indicated that the distribution of responses for this variable was not 
normally distributed. This is indicated graphically by normal probability plots, and 
a histogram that shows the data follow a normal distribution with a peak showing 
larger observations above the mean (kurtosis .43) and negative skewness (-.59). 
Statistical testing also indicated the data did not follow a normal distribution with 
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = .010) and the Anderson-Darling (p=.005) tests 
rejecting the hypothesis that the data were normally distributed.  
The plots related to the distribution of participant’s difference in reliance on 
management’s forecasts (H4) indicated the data were positively skewed (.35) 
with slightly more observations in the upper end of the tail (kurtosis .21). The 
conclusions reached by the graphical analysis were supported by a statistical 
analysis of the data using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p = .010) and Anderson-
Darling (p = .005), which rejected the hypothesis of normally distributed data.  
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While only one of the four dependent variables met the assumption of 
normality, the ANCOVA method is robust to even critical violations of the 
normality assumption (Keppel 1982).  The robustness of the ANCOVA 
methodology with respect to violations of normality is even greater when an 
equal number of observations per treatment group is compared, which is the 
case in this study. For these reasons, no adjustments were made to the data to 
address the non-normality found in the data.  
4.4.4.3. Variance Between Groups  
Testing the variances between groups involves looking at all of the levels 
of the independent variables to determine if the variance is similar at all levels.  
When the variance in the dependent variable is similar for all levels of the 
independent variable, the data are said to be homoscedastic. When there is a 
different amount of variance in the dependent variable at each level of the 
independent variable, the data are said to be heteroscedastic. Two tests were 
conducted to check for heteroscedasticity. A Levene’s test for equality of 
variances was used, and a linear relationship was examined between the 
squared residuals and the predicted values for the dependent variables. The 
second test was conducted since it has already been determined the data are 
non-normal and a Levene’s test is sensitive to non-normality.  
Using a Levene’s test of equal variances, it was determined that the 
credibility rating (H1) data did not display equal variance at all levels of the 
independent variable (p =.089). However, less than 1 percent of the variation in 
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the squared residuals was found to be associated with the predicted period one 
credibility rating variable, indicating no significant variance problems.  
The Levene’s test was also run for the reliance on management’s forecast 
(H2) variable. Test results indicated that the distribution of responses displayed 
unequal variances across treatment conditions (p = .024). This was also found by 
testing the linear relationship between the squared residuals and the predicted 
values of the dependent variables. The results indicated that 13.7 percent of the 
variation in the squared residuals was associated with the variation in the 
predicted values. 
In testing the variance between groups for the difference in credibility ratings 
(H3) variable, the Levene’s test indicated the variance in the data was not 
consistent at all levels of the independent variable (p = .014).  Evidence 
contradicting the Levene’s test indicated less than 1 percent of the variance in 
the squared residuals was associated with the predicted difference in credibility 
ratings variable.  
Finally, when testing the variance between groups for difference in reliance 
on management’s forecast (H4), the Levene’s test indicated the variance 
displayed was equal for all four treatment groups (p =.169). 
Only one of the four variables consistently displayed heteroscedasticity 
(reliance on management’s forecast). While it is prudent to exercise caution 
when interpreting results involving heteroscedasticity, the heteroscedasticity 
involving reliance on management’s forecasts has been mitigated by the use of 
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equal cell sizes (Glass and Hopkins 1996; Garson 2006). Therefore, the 
heteroscedasticity found in the variables in this study is not a concern. 
4.4.4.4. Testing for Outliers 
Outliers are data points that seem to indicate they may not be 
representative of the sample population. An assumption of the ANCOVA 
procedure is that the data are representative of the sample population. To test 
the data regarding representativeness in relation to the sample population, 
statistical tests were conducted to find potential outliers in the dataset.  
A Studentized Residual statistic was used to determine if there were 
outliers. The Studentized Residual procedure looks at the influence of each data 
point by removing it from the analysis and then examining the influence the 
individual observation had on the overall significance of the model. The 
calculation for the Studentized Residual statistic divides the deleted residual 
value by its standard error. A cutoff residual value of +/- 3.641 is used as a rule of 
thumb to identify outliers (Mendenhall and Sincich 1996). No outliers were found 
with respect credibility ratings (H1), the reliance on management’s forecast (H2), 
and for the difference in credibility rating (H3).  Two outliers were identified for 
the difference in reliance on management’s forecasts (H4). The model was tested 
with both values eliminated. There was little effect on the overall model’s 
significance after removing these observations but the observations did have a 
significant effect on the results of the ANCOVA for the main treatment (the 
financial results letter).  The significance level of the t-test for the financial results 
letter went from .125 to .235. Since the results for H4 are insignificant, both with 
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and without these two observations the observations were kept in the model 
leaving the model with an equal number of observations per cell.  
4.4.4.5 Assumptions Testing Summary 
While some of the assumptions tested were found to be violated, the 
statistical method (ANCOVA) employed in this study is fairly robust with respect 
to violations of normality and heteroscedasticity when there are equal treatment 
groups as was the case in this study (Glass and Hopkins 1996; Garson 2006). 
The one instance where outliers were observed (H4) did not impact the 
interpretation of the results.   
4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
In this section the statistical results for the four hypotheses are presented. 
Descriptive statistics for the relevant variables are presented first. Conclusions 
about the degree of support for the hypotheses are presented in this chapter. 
The overall conclusions regarding the results of the hypotheses tests are 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
4.5.1  Testing of H1 and H2 
The effect of the report on internal control (either high intention tone or no 
intention tone) was tested on the dependent variables, credibility rating (H1) and 
the reliance on management’s forecast (H2). The significant covariates identified 
in section 4.4 were included in each model to account for their potential impact 
on the dependent variables.   
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4.5.1.1 Management’s Credibility Rating (H1) 
H1 predicted that users given management’s letter on internal controls 
with a high intention tone would rate management’s credibility higher than 
participants given management’s letter on internal controls with a no intention 
tone. To determine the credibility rating (H1), participants completed the 
McCroskey and Teven (1999) credibility scale. The scale consists of 18 items 
with six questions for each of three factors: intention, trustworthiness, and 
expertise. To simplify the data analysis, the average credibility score was used 
for testing differences between the groups.   
Table 25 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, 
credibility rating.  As can be seen in Table 25, participants who were given 
management’s report on internal controls with the high intention tone rated 
management’s credibility higher (mean = 7.886) than participants who received 
the report with the no intention manipulation (mean = 7.088).  These means are 
in line with H1, which predicted that participants in the high intention treatment 
would rate management’s credibility higher than would participants in the no 
intention treatment. 
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Table 25: Descriptive Statistics for Credibility Rating (H1) 
Descriptive Statistics for the Credibility Rating by Management Internal Control Letter 
Treatment 
 High Intention Letter No Intention Letter 
Covariate 
Mean  
(Standard Dev) Min Max 
Mean 
(Standard Dev) Min Max 
Credibility 
Rating 7.886 (1.517) 5.055 11.000 7.008 (1.235) 4.222 11.000
       
Credibility Rating: The average of the 18 questions from the McCroskey and Teven (1999) 
Credibility Scale 
 
To see if the participants in the high intention internal control letter 
treatment rated management’s credibility higher than participants who were given 
the no intention internal control letter (H1) an ANCOVA was run using the internal 
control report as the treatment and credibility rating as the dependent variable. 
Four covariates identified in Table 14 as possibly impacting credibility rating were 
also included in the model: participant’s confidence in completing the task 
(CONFIDENCE), their views on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP), their prior mutual fund investments (INVESTED IN MUTUAL 
FUND), and their familiarity with Auditing Standard No. 2 (ASNO2 
FAMILIARITY).  Table 26 shows the results of the ANCOVA model. The overall 
model is statistically significant (F = 7.94, two-tailed p< .001).  
Table 26 also indicates that the impact of the different internal control 
letters on credibility ratings was significant (F = 6.94, one tail p=.006). The 
significant effect was in the direction hypothesized (see Table 22), supporting H1.  
All four of the covariates were significant factors in the model. Three of the 
covariates were positively correlated with management’s credibility ratings and 
one was negatively correlated with management’s credibility rating. Participants’ 
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opinions regarding the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP) were 
significantly (F = 9.20, two-tailed p = .003) associated with credibility ratings, 
indicating that more knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley led to higher ratings of 
management’s credibility.  Participants’ confidence (CONFIDENCE) in 
completing the task was also significantly (F =4.66, two-tailed p = .033) 
associated with the ratings of management’s credibility, indicating that more 
confidence led to higher ratings of management’s credibility. Understanding of 
Auditing Standard No. 2 (ASNO2 FAMILIARITY) was also significantly (F =4.31, 
two-tailed, p = .040) associated with management credibility ratings, as greater 
understanding of Auditing Standard No. 2 led to higher credibility ratings. 
Investment history with mutual funds was significantly (F =8.91, two-tailed p = 
.004) associated with management’s credibility ratings as well, but higher values 
on this question led to lower management credibility ratings.  
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Table 26: ANCOVA Results for Internal Control Letter’s Impact on Credibility Ratings 
(H1) 
Variable DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value 
Internal Control Letter 1 10.422 10.422 6.49 .006*
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP 1 14.770 14.770 9.20 .003
CONFIDENCE 1 7.485 7.485 4.66 .033
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY 1 6.914 6.914 4.31 .040
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 1 14.302 14.302 8.91 .004 
  
Model 5 63.790 12.758 7.94 <.000
Error 118 189.499 1.606     
Corrected Total 123 253.289       
 
Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone. 
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud. 
CONFIDENCE: Question asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share 
predictions. 
ASNO2 FAMILIARITY: Question asked participants about their familiarity with Auditing 
Standard No. 2. 
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Question asked participants if they had invested in mutual 
funds 
 
 *P-Value adjusted for one-tailed test for Internal Control Letter only.   
 
4.5.1.2 Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) 
H2 predicts that users given management’s letter on internal controls with 
a high intention tone will rely more on management’s forecasts by revising their 
EPS forecast closer to management’s forecast than participants given the 
internal control letter with no intention tone. Before testing H2, the participants’ 
initial earnings per share estimates were compared between groups. The tone of 
the internal control letter should not have an effect on the initial earnings per 
share estimates made by participants. It was important to test the differences 
between the groups’ initial earnings per share estimates because the tone of the 
internal control letters is expected to impact the participants’ perception of 
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management’s credibility, and therefore, the amount by which participants rely on 
management’s forecast. The hypothesized relationship is between the two 
versions of the internal control letter and participants’ reliance on management’s 
forecast and not the participants’ initial predictions. The results of the study could 
be impacted if the different internal control letters systematically resulted in user’s 
estimating different initial earnings per share estimates for the company. As seen 
in Table 27 both groups had similar predictions for period one. The mean for the 
high intention treatment was $1.99 and the mean for the no intention treatment 
was $1.97, resulting in a statistically insignificant (t = .55, two-tailed p = .461) 
mean difference of $.02.  
In addition to the period one prediction by participants, Table 27 also 
shows management’s prediction of earnings per share estimates for period one 
and the participants’ revisions of earnings per share after receiving 
management’s prediction. Since management’s period one prediction is 
mathematically derived based on the participants’ initial period one prediction, no 
significant (t = .55, p = .461) difference exists between the two groups concerning 
management’s predictions of earnings per share for the groups in period one.  
H2 examines the reliance of participants’ on management’s forecast. 
Table 2 demonstrated how the participants’ reliance on management’s forecast is 
calculated.  First the difference between the participants’ revised earnings per 
share estimate and their initial earnings per share estimate is calculated, this is 
called the difference in EPS estimates. The difference in EPS estimates is then 
divided by the amount of surprise in management’s forecasts. The amount of 
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surprise in management’s forecast is measured as the difference in 
management’s prediction and the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. 
The result is the reliance on management’s forecast, which is used as a measure 
of management’s credibility.  For example, if management’s prediction was $.50 
higher than the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate and the 
participant raised his/her earnings per share estimate by $.25, then the reliance 
on management’s forecast would be 50 percent.16  
As Table 27 demonstrates participants in the high intention treatment 
relied on management’s forecast and adjusted their earnings per share estimates 
by about 34.3 percent ($.22/$.64) of management’s advocated change, while 
participants in the no intention treatment only adjusted their earnings per share 
estimates by 22.2 percent ($.14/$.63) of management’s advocated change. The 
greater reliance on management’s forecast found in the high intention treatment 
was consistent with the prediction of H2. 
                                                 
16 The percentage change from participant’s first and second estimate was considered as an 
alternate measure of reliance. However, I believe measuring reliance as a percentage of the 
change advocated by management makes the practical explanation of the results clearer. If 
management’s advocated adjustment (the surprise) is 100%, this variable is a measure of how 
much of that adjustment the participants believed was necessary.  
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics for the Reliance on Management’s Forecasts (H2) 
Participants’ 
Initial  
EPS Estimate 
Mean (Std. 
dev.) 
Min – Max 
Management's 
EPS Forecast 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min – Max * 
Surprise in 
Management’s 
Forecast ** 
Participants’ 
Revised 
EPS Estimate 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Participants’ 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min – Max *** 
Treatment 
Condition 
 
      
High 
Intention $1.99 (.115) $2.63 (.151) $.64 (.037) $2.21 (.264) .343 (.328) 
 $1.50 -$2.250 $1.980 – $2.970 $.480 -$.720 $1.550 – $2.870 0 - 1.225 
       
No 
Intention $1.97 (.211) $2.60 (.279) $.63 (.068) $2.11 (.279) .222 (.242) 
 $.500 - $2.20 $.660 - $2.90 $.160 - $.704 $.500 – $2.600  0 - .987 
      
* Calculated as Participant’s Initial Earnings Per Share * 1. 32 
** Calculated as Management’s EPS Forecast – Participant’s Initial EPS Estimate 
*** Calculated as (Participant’s Revised EPS – Participant’s Initial EPS) / Surprise in Management’s Forecast 
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The impact of the different internal control letters on the reliance on 
management’s forecast was tested using ANOVA. Four covariates were included 
in the model. Recall from Table 16 that participants’ familiarity with Sarbanes-
Oxley (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP), confidence in their earnings per share 
estimates (CONFIDENCE), their prior history with investing (PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED), and their expectation of management inflating earnings (EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS) were significantly correlated with the reliance on 
management’s earnings per share estimates; thus, they were included as 
controls for the test of H2.  
Table 28 indicates the overall ANCOVA model used to test H2 was 
statistically significant (F = 5.86, two-tailed p <.000). As reflected in Table 28, the 
impact of the internal control letters was a statistically significant factor (F = 4.27, 
one-tailed p = .021) in the difference in reliance on management’s forecast 
between participants in the high intention treatment (34.3 percent) and 
participants in the no intention treatment (22.2 percent), supporting H2. In 
agreement with the information provided in Table 16, all four covariates were 
significantly (alpha of .10) associated with reliance on management’s forecast. 
 112 
 
 
Table 28: ANCOVA Test of Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H2) 
Variable DF 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Squares F Statistic P-Value 
Internal Control Letter 1 0.305 0.305 4.27 0.021*
FRAUD SOX 
RELATIONSHIP 1 0.451 0.451 6.31 0.014  
CONFIDENCE 1 0.491 0.491 6.88 0.010
EXPECT MANAGEMENT 
INFLATE EPS 1 0.693 0.693 9.71 0.002  
PREVIOUSLY 
INVESTED 1 0.242 0.242 3.39 0.066 
  
Model 5 2.090 0.418 5.86 0.000
Error 118 8.427 0.071     
Corrected Total 123 10.518       
 
Internal Control Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone. 
FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP: Question asked the relevance of Sarbanes-Oxley to fraud. 
CONFIDENCE: Question asked participants their confidence in their earnings per share 
predictions. 
EXPECT MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS: Question asked participants if they expected 
management to inflate their earnings per share predictions.  
PREVIOUSLY INVESTED: Question asked participants if they had ever made an investment in 
the stock market. 
 * P-Value adjusted for one-tailed test.        
 
Three of the covariates were negatively correlated with the participants’ 
reliance on management’s forecast and one covariate was positively correlated 
with reliance on management’s forecast.  The three negatively correlated 
covariates were all significant with respect to the model and included participants’ 
feelings regarding the Sarbanes Oxley Act (FRAUD SOX RELATIONSHIP) 
(F=6.31, two-tailed p= .014), their confidence (CONFIDENCE) in their earnings 
per share predictions (F= 6.88, two-tailed p= .010), and their expectations that 
management would inflate earnings (EXPECT MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS) 
(F= 9.71, two-tailed p= .002). As the response values to these questions 
increased, participants’ reliance on management’s forecasts decreased. 
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Intuitively this made sense for the confidence (CONFIDENCE) variable and the 
expectation of management to inflate its earnings per share estimates (EXPECT 
MANAGEMENT INFLATE EPS). The more confident participants were in their 
selection of earnings per share the less likely they were to revise their forecast. 
Also, the more participants expected management to inflate its earnings per 
share estimates, the less likely they were to revise their own earnings per share 
estimates after receiving management’s. There is no intuitive reasoning for 
participant’s beliefs about the relevance on the Sarbanes Oxley Act (FRAUD 
SOX RELATIONSHIP) to reduce their reliance on management’s forecasts.  
Participants’ prior investing experience (PREVIOUSLY INVESTED) was 
significant (F= 3.39, two-tailed p=.066) and positively correlated with the reliance 
on management’s forecast, indicating participants with more investing experience 
tended to rely more on management’s forecasts.  
4.5.2 Testing of H3 and H4 
For period one, it was predicted that a letter from management with the 
high intention tone would lead to greater reliance on management’s earnings per 
share forecast. In part, this was due to the fact that the participants in period one 
had no prior information regarding management’s past forecast accuracy. Prior 
research has shown that management’s past forecast accuracy can impact 
management’s credibility ratings (Williams 1996; Hirst et al. 1999). When 
management fails to forecast accurately its credibility drops and so too does the 
market’s reliance on management’s forecasts. All of the participants in period two 
of the study knew of management’s failure to accurately forecast its earnings per 
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share in period one. Therefore, it was expected that all of the participants’ ratings 
of management’s credibility would drop because management failed to meet its 
predicted earnings per share estimate from period one. Period two of the study 
examines the impact of manipulating management’s tone in a communication 
with investors when investors have prior knowledge of management’s inability to 
forecast accurately. For H3 and H4 the intention factor of management’s 
credibility is manipulated using the tone of a communication from management to 
recipients who have received only inaccurate past forecasts from management.  
In period one, half of the participants in the study either received management’s 
statement of internal controls with a high or no intention manipulation. In period 
two, the participants received a letter from management communicating the 
actual earnings results from period one of the study. The intention factor of 
credibility was manipulated in the actual earnings letter at either a high intention 
or no intention tone. 
4.5.2.1 The Difference in Credibility Ratings from Period One to Period 
Two (H3) 
Hypothesis three examines the impact of the communication tone (high 
intention vs. no intention) in the financial results letter on the difference in 
participants’ rating of management’s credibility from period one to period two. 
When management failed to meet its forecast, the prediction was that 
management would experience a smaller difference in credibility ratings from 
participants who received an earnings letter with the high intention manipulation.  
Each participant completed the credibility scale twice; once after reading 
the internal control letter from management and once after reading the letter from 
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management explaining the company’s failure to forecast earnings per share. To 
test H3, participants’ ratings of management’s overall credibility in period two 
were subtracted from participants’ overall ratings of credibility in period one.  
  Table 29 presents the credibility rating scores for period one and period 
two, as well as the difference in overall credibility ratings from period one to 
period two. As can be seen in Table 29, participants who received the high 
intention financial results letter in period two reduced their rating of 
management’s credibility less than participants who received the no intention 
financial results letter. The participants who received the high intention financial 
results letter in period two rated management’s mean credibility 7.513 in period 
one and 7.009 in period two; thus, the decline in management’s credibility ratings 
is .504. The participants who received the no intention financial results letter in 
period two rated management’s credibility 7.461 in period one and 6.594 in 
period two; thus, the decline in credibility ratings is .867. The participants in the 
no intention treatment reduced their ratings of management credibility by more 
than participants in the high intention treatment.  
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Table 29: Descriptive Statistics for the Difference in Credibility Ratings from Period One 
to Period Two (H3) 
Credibility Ratings for Period One and Period Two and the Difference in Credibility 
Ratings from Period One to Period Two 
Treatment 
Condition 
Period One Credibility 
Rating 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Period Two Credibility 
Rating 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Difference in  Credibility 
Ratings 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
7.513 (1.450) 7.009 (1.876) 0.504* (1.466) High 
Intention 4.222 -  11.000 3.281 - 10.940 -4.333 -  2.166 
    
7.461 (1.431) 6.594 (1.764) 0.867* (1.017) No  
Intention 5.000 - 10.611 3.333 - 10.500 -3.500 -  .500 
62 participants in each treatment condition 
* Positive means indicate a gain of credibility 
 
Prior testing (Table 17 and 18) revealed that two covariates should be 
included in the analysis of H3. The two covariates are study of Sarbanes-Oxley 
(STUDIED SOX) and investment in mutual fund (INVESTED IN MUTUAL 
FUND). These covariates are included in the ANCOVA model reported in Table 
30, which displays the results of testing the difference in credibility ratings 
between the high intention and no intention tone financial results letters for period 
two. The model is significant (F= 5.55, two-tail p=.002). In support of H3, the 
financial results letter indicates a significant (F= 2.66, one-tailed p = .053) 
difference in credibility ratings.  
Both covariates were significant with respect to the model. Student’s 
history with studying Sarbanes-Oxley was significantly (F= 4.17, two-tailed p= 
.044) associated with the difference in credibility ratings, indicating that more 
knowledge of Sarbanes-Oxley led to larger drops in rating management’s 
credibility. There was also a significant (F= 9.06, two-tailed p= .032) difference in 
responses for students who had previously invested in mutual funds. Those with 
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previous investment experience were also more likely to drop their rating of 
management’s credibility from period one to period two.  
Table 30: ANCOVA Test of Difference in Credibility Ratings (H3) 
 
Variable DF 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Squares F Statistic P-Value 
Financial Results Letter 1 3.866 3.866 2.66 0.053*
STUDIED SOX 1 6.059 6.059 4.17 0.044
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 1 13.149 13.149 9.06 0.032
  
Model 3 24.147 8.049 5.55 0.002
Error 120 174.160 1.451     
Corrected Total 123 205.486       
    
* One tailed P-Value     
Financial Results Letter: Treatment given with either high intention tone or no intention tone. 
 STUDIED SOX: Question asked participants if they studied Sarbanes-Oxley. 
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND: Question asked participants if they had invested in mutual 
funds 
 
4.5.2.2 The Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4) 
Hypothesis four examines the difference in reliance on management’s 
forecast from period one to period two of the study. It was predicted that the 
communication tone (high intention vs. no intention) of the financial results letter 
would impact the difference in reliance on management’s forecast from period 
one to period two. While H3 examines the loss in the creditability rating scores 
from period one to period two, H4 examines the difference in reliance on 
management’s forecast from period one to period two. It was predicted that 
participants who received the high intention financial results letter would have a 
smaller decline in reliance on management’s forecasts after receiving 
management’s estimate than the participants who received the financial results 
letter with no intention manipulation.  
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In each period of the study participants’ reliance on management’s 
forecasts was indicated by the revision in their initial earnings per share 
estimates after receiving management’s forecast. As defined in the testing of H2 
and demonstrated in Table 2, the reliance on management’s forecasts is first 
measured by subtracting the participants’ revised earnings per share estimate 
from their initial earnings per share estimate, and then dividing that difference by 
the amount of surprise in management’s forecasts. The amount of surprise in 
management’s forecast is measured as the difference in management’s 
prediction and the participant’s initial earnings per share prediction.17 The result 
of the calculation is the percentage change in forecasts, which is used as a 
measure of reliance on management’s forecasts. The reliance on management’s 
forecast was made for both periods one and two and the difference in reliance on 
management’s forecast (H4) is then measured as the percentage change 
(revision) from period two subtracted from the percentage change (revision) in 
period one.  
 Figure 1 demonstrates the research model used in the study. Only two 
factors influence the amount of investors’ belief revision: surprise and credibility. 
By holding the amount of surprise constant and then comparing the difference in 
the amount of belief revision between period one and period two of the study it is 
possible to attribute the belief revision to the decrease or loss in management’s 
credibility. For example, if a participant had relied on management’s forecast and 
                                                 
17  The percentage change in participant’s earnings per share estimates is calculated as (Revised 
earnings per share - Initial earning per share) / (Management’s predicted earnings per share – 
Initial earnings per share.) 
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revised his/her earnings per share estimate by 30 percent of what management 
advocated in period one and only 20 percent in period two, the participant’s 
reliance on management’s information dropped. Since the amount of surprise 
was held constant the change in beliefs must be due to a drop in credibility as 
less reliance was placed on management’s surprise information in period two.  
Table 31 provides the descriptive statistics for the difference in reliance on 
management’s forecast between groups. The participants who received the 
financial statement letter with the high intention manipulation revised their 
earnings per share estimates in period one by 24.0 percent of the change 
advocated by management. In period two they revised their earnings per share 
estimates by only 10.8 percent of management’s advocated change. Overall, the 
participants who received the high intention financial statement letter had a 
decline in reliance on management’s forecasts of 13.2 percent.  In contrast, the 
participants who received the financial statement letter with no intention 
manipulation revised their earnings per share estimates in period one by 31.3 
percent of the change advocated by management, and in period two they revised 
their earnings per share estimates by 15.7 percent of management’s advocated 
change. Overall the participants who received the no intention financial statement 
letter had a decline in reliance on management’s forecasts of 15.5 percent from 
period one to period two.  
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Table 31: Descriptive Statistics for the Difference in Reliance on Management’s 
Forecasts (H4) 
Reliance on Management’s Forecast for Period One & Period Two and the Reduction in 
Reliance Between Periods 
Treatment 
Condition 
Period One 
EPS Adjustment 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min – Max 
Period Two 
EPS Adjustment 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
Mean Difference in 
EPS Adjustment 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
Min - Max 
0.240 (.278) 0.108 (.149) 0.132* (.267) High 
Intention 0 - 1.225 0 - 0.614 -0.510 - 0.864 
    
.313 (.304) .157 (.220) .156* (.297) No  
Intention 0 – 1.000 0 - 1.007 -0.625 - 0.792 
62 participants in each treatment condition 
* Positive means indicate a gain of credibility 
 
To test H4, an ANCOVA model was used to determine if the difference 
between the groups receiving the high intention letter and the no intention letter 
was statistically significant. The dependent variable used in the model was the 
difference in reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to period two 
and the independent variable was the financial statement letter. One variable 
was included as a covariate (useful) to control for differences found between 
participants’ estimates of earnings per share and the actual earnings per share 
for period one.18 Table 32 displays the results of the ANCOVA model. The model 
is significant (F= 100.77, two-tailed p-value <.000). While the model is significant, 
the financial statement letter is insignificant (F = 1.34, one-tailed p=.125). 
                                                 
18 For more information on the useful variable refer to section 4.4.2.8.4 and Table 19.  
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Table 32: ANCOVA Results for Difference in Reliance on Management’s Forecast (H4) 
Variables DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Squares F Statistic P-Value 
Financial Results Letter 1 0.040 0.040 1.34 .125*
Useful 1 6.083 6.083 200.99 < .000
  
Model 2 6.099 3.049 100.77 < .000
Error 121 3.662 0.030     
Corrected Total 123 9.761       
    
Financial Results Letter: Given at two levels high intention and no intention tone. 
Useful: The usefulness of the period one forecast. 
 * One tailed P-Value  
 
The covariate (useful) was found to be significant (F=200.99, two-tailed 
p<.000) and had the greatest influence on the participant’s loss of credibility in 
period two.  The useful variable measured the difference between participants’ 
final earnings per share estimate in period one and the actual earnings per share 
for the company. Positive values of the useful variable indicate that participants’ 
final earnings per share estimate was above the actual earnings per share for the 
company. Negative values of the useful variable indicated participants’ final 
earnings per share estimates were below the actual earnings per share for the 
company.  Participants with larger positive values of the useful variable relied 
less on management’s forecast in period two.   
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4.6 Post Hoc Analysis 
4.6.1  Overview of Post Hoc Analysis 
In this section of the study I will examine other impacts of the treatments 
on participants’ judgment and decision making.  The post hoc analysis will 
proceed as follows. In period one, H1 predicted that the internal control letter 
would impact the rating of management’s credibility. Since the “management 
credibility” construct actually comprises three sub-factors—intention, 
trustworthiness, and expertise—the impact of the internal control letter (high 
intention vs. no intention) on each of these three sub-factors will be examined in 
the post-hoc analysis.  
Also discussed will be the unintended treatment created by the design of 
the study. The impact of the unintended treatment on the results of period two 
was included in the model for H4 as a covariate called useful. The useful variable 
will be examined further in this section.  
4.6.2  The Impact of Altering Tone on the Perception of Management’s 
Credibility  
When the participants filled out the credibility scale in period one, they 
completed 18 questions that load on three sub-factors of credibility. In period 
one, an average credibility score comprised of all 18 questions was used to 
examine the differences between groups. In this section a MANOVA test is used 
to determine the impact of the management internal control letter on each of the 
average scores for the three sub-factors of credibility (intention, trustworthiness 
and expertise). The results of the ANOVA tests are presented in Table 33. Recall 
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from Table 25, participants in the high intention treatment gave management a 
mean credibility rating of 7.89 compared to those in the no intention treatment 
who rated management’s average credibility at 7.01. These results were similar 
for the three sub-factors of credibility. With respect to the intention factor of 
credibility participants in the high intention treatment rated management’s 
intention an average of 7.66 while participants in the no intention treatment rated 
management’s intention an average of 6.66. With respect to management’s 
trustworthiness, participants in the high intention treatment rated management’s 
trustworthiness 7.68 on average while participants in the no intention treatment 
rated management’s trustworthiness 7.02 on average.  There was also a 
significant difference with respect to management’s expertise ratings. The 
participants in the high intention group rated management’s expertise an average 
of 8.31 while participants in the no intention group rated management’s expertise 
7.58 on average. The letters from management with a manipulated intention tone 
significantly (p = .05) impacted each of the sub-factors of management’s 
credibility.  
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Table 33: Descriptive Statistics for Sub-Factors of Credibility 
Treatment High Intention No Intention Comparison 
Credibility Question  
(1=Less 11=More) Mean   (Std. Dev.) Mean  (Std. Dev.) F Statistic p-value* 
Average Intention 7.669   (1.768) 6.664   (1.311) 12.93 < 0.000 
Average Trust 7.682   (1.679) 7.024   (1.303) 5.95 0.008 
Average Expertise 8.306   (1.522) 7.578   (1.400) 7.7 0.003 
 
* One tailed p-value 
 
4.6.3 Examination of Period Two Results as a Function of the Usefulness of 
Period One’s Prediction 
In period two, it was expected that the participants who received the 
financial statement results letter with the high intention tone of credibility would 
have a smaller change in reliance on management’s forecast than the 
participants who received the financial results letter with no intention tone. Upon 
further examination it was determined that the most significant factor impacting 
the results for H4 was the period one forecast.   
The study was originally designed as a one period study examining the 
impact of altering the tone of the communication from management to investors 
on investors’ ratings of management’s credibility and reliance on management’s 
forecast. The design of the study was then expanded to a second period. For 
period two, it was decided that for both treatment groups, management would fail 
to meet its forecasted results for period one, thus lowering the credibility of 
management. A written communication from management would be used to 
attempt to reduce the loss of credibility resulting from failing to meet forecasted 
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earnings. It was expected that altering the tone of the written communication 
would reduce the loss of credibility.   
In period one of the study, participants were allowed to freely pick their 
initial earnings per share estimates, and management’s prediction of earnings 
per share, as well as the actual period one results, were based on a constant 
percentage of each participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. 
Management’s forecasts were always 132 percent of the participants’ initial 
earnings per share estimates and actual results were always 109 percent of the 
initial earnings per share estimate. For example, if one participant predicted 
earnings per share in period one of $1.00, management’s prediction of earnings 
per share would be $1.32 and the actual results for the period would be reported 
as $1.09.  A second participant could select an initial earnings per share estimate 
of $2.00 and be told management had predicted earnings per share of $2.64 with 
the actual results for period one at $2.18. The comparisons across all treatment 
groups were made based on percentage changes and not absolute dollar 
amounts. So if the participant in example one had revised his/her initial estimate 
to $1.16 and the participant in example two had revised his/her initial estimate to 
$2.32 then both participants had revised their predictions by 50 percent of 
management’s recommendation. A comparison of initial earnings per share 
estimates by participants in period one revealed no difference between the 
groups in the high and low condition. Therefore, both groups effectively began 
period two at the same point since the actual period one earnings were based on 
the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate from period one.   
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While participants in period one began the study at about the same place 
with respect to earnings per share estimates (no difference in their earnings per 
share between groups), they were not at the same place at the conclusion of 
period one of the study. The participants in the high intention treatment had 
revised their initial earnings per share estimates (34 percent) more than the 
participants in the no intention treatment (22 percent).  An example of the 
difference caused by the revision in period one can be explained as follows. 
Using two participants “X1” and “X2,” assume X1 is assigned to the high intention 
treatment in period one and X2 is assigned to the no intention treatment in period 
one. Both X1 and X2 predict their initial earnings per share estimate as $1.00. 
They will both receive the same earnings per share estimate from management 
of $1.32 and actual earnings for period one will be reported as $1.09. Suppose, 
participant X1 revised his earnings per share by 34 percent of the surprise 
information given by management or $.11 (34 percent x $.32 = $.11) while 
participant X2 revised her initial prediction by 22 percent of the surprise 
information given by management or $.08   (22 percent x $.32= $.08).  When the 
actual results for period one are reported at $1.09, participant X1, in the high 
intention group, had an estimate that was higher ($1.11) than the actual results of 
$1.09 while X2 had a prediction that was lower ($1.08) than the actual results. It 
was assumed that all participants would begin the period using the actual 
earnings from period one as a basis for the period two tasks. The difference 
between each participant’s period one revised estimate and the actual earnings 
per share for period one might inadvertently have impacted the effectiveness of 
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the treatments in period two.  The difference found between the revised period 
one estimates and actual period one results impacted both participants’ initial 
earnings predictions for period two and the amount of reliance on management’s 
forecasts for period two.   
The impact of this unintended variable can actually be explained with prior 
findings from accounting literature. Williams (1996) examined the relationship 
between the usefulness of prior earnings forecasts by management and analyst 
revisions to current forecasts.  In her study, Williams gives an example of the 
usefulness of a prior forecast where two companies (firm A and firm B) made 
earnings predictions of $2.75 and $2.50, respectively. The actual earnings per 
share of each company was $3.00, so Firm A’s forecast was deemed more 
accurate. To differentiate accuracy from usefulness, Williams furthers the 
example by supposing that analysts had estimates of earnings for Firm A of 
$2.90 ($.10 lower than actual earnings) and Firm B of $2.00 ($1.00 lower than 
the actual earnings). For Firm A, management’s forecast was $.15 lower than 
analysts’ forecast and for Firm B management’s forecast was $.50 higher than 
analysts’ forecasts. Thus, in this example, Firm B’s forecast was more useful to 
analysts since it provided more information based on analysts’ current level of 
belief, even if it was not more accurate.  
Data from the current study can be used to test Williams (1998) notion of a 
difference between forecast usefulness and forecast accuracy. In period one of 
this study management’s forecasts and the actual results for period one were a 
fixed percentage of each participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. The 
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accuracy of management’s forecast was constant between all of the participants 
in the study. What varied between participants in period one of the study was the 
participants’ revised expectations of earnings per share. Therefore, for each 
participant we can determine the usefulness of management’s prediction by 
examining the difference between each participant’s revised (or expected) 
earnings per share and the actual earnings per share for period one.  
Participants who were in the high intention treatment for period one had a 
mean difference of .033 above the actual earnings per share, while participants 
who were in the no intention treatment in period one had a mean difference of 
.035 below the actual earnings per share. This difference between the two 
treatments was statistically significant (F= 4.15, one-tailed p=.022). 
 In examining the percentage of accuracy for management’s prediction, 
both of the treatment groups had management predictions that were identical. 
Management’s initial prediction of earnings was 132 percent of participants’ initial 
earnings per share estimate and the actual earnings were 109 percent of the 
participants’ initial earnings per share estimate for both groups.  
The expectation of earnings per share for the participants in the high 
intention group was above the actual earnings per share for period one, while the 
expectations of earnings per share for the no intention tone group was lower than 
the actual earnings per share for period one. The data indicate that participants  
whose expectations were above the actual earnings per share in period one 
predicted lower earnings per share estimates for period two but they also did not 
revise their earnings per share estimates in period two as much as the 
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participants whose expectations of earnings per share were below the actual 
results for period one.  Stated differently, participant’s who had experienced 
management’s earnings per share estimates that were below the actual earnings 
per share estimates in period one found the period two management forecast of 
earnings per share to be more useful. Since accuracy was held constant 
between treatment conditions, these results indicate that the usefulness of the 
forecast and not the forecast accuracy was driving the results in period two. 
These findings add some support for the Williams (1998) proposition that 
forecast usefulness and forecast accuracy are two separate constructs. 
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5.0 Summary and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Study 
This study was designed to examine the impact of the intention factor of 
management credibility on investors’ decision making. Credibility is a latent 
variable with three sub-factors: expertise, trustworthiness, and intentions. The 
intention factor of credibility is a perception variable that measures perceived 
understanding, empathy, and responsiveness of a communicator. The study 
manipulated management’s intention via written communications with 
participants. The impact of manipulating the perception of management’s 
intention factor of credibility was then examined using both ratings of 
management’s credibility and by examining participant’s reliance on 
management’s forecasts of earnings per share estimates.  
There were four hypotheses tested in this study. In H1 and H2 participants 
had no information regarding management’s prior forecast history.  In H3 and H4 
the changes from period one to period two were examined after participant’s 
experienced management failing to meet its forecast from period one.  
As stated above, in period one of the study, participants had no prior 
knowledge of management’s forecast accuracy. The participants, representing 
average investors, were given background financial information regarding the 
company. Included in the financial information was a letter from management 
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regarding the effectiveness of internal controls for the company as required by 
the PCAOB. One half of the participants received a letter that had a high 
intention tone, while the other half received a letter with no intention tone. H1 
predicted that participants who received the high intention tone letter would rate 
management’s credibility higher than participants who received the letter from 
management with no intention manipulation.  The findings from the study 
supported the prediction of H1, in that participants who received the high 
intention letter from management rated management’s credibility significantly 
higher than the participant’s who received the letter with no intention tone. These 
findings were statistically significant at an alpha of .10. This suggests that 
management can increase its credibility by communicating with a tone that 
implies understanding, empathy, and responsiveness to investors’ concerns. 
In addition to testing the rating of management’s credibility, a second 
hypothesis was also tested in period one.  Participants in both groups (high 
intention vs. no intention tone) completed a task in which they predicted earnings 
per share for the company for period one. After making their earnings per share 
predictions they received management’s prediction of earnings per share. 
Participants were then given an opportunity to revise their earnings per share 
prediction. H2 predicted that participant’s who had received the high intention 
letter would rely more on management’s predictions by revising their earnings 
per share estimates closer to management’s than those participants who 
received the letter from management with the no intentions manipulation.  
Support was found for H2 as participants who had received the high intention 
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treatment revised their earnings per share to a greater degree than those who 
received the letter with no intention tone.  
In period two of the study, H3 and H4 were tested. Period two of the study 
begins with the participants from period one receiving a letter from management 
stating the actual earnings per share for period one. For all participants 
management failed to meet its forecasted estimate. Failing to meet its forecasted 
estimate of earnings per share should reduce management’s credibility (Williams 
1996; Hirst et al. 1999). The manipulation for H3 and H4 had one half of the 
participants receive the earnings letter with a high intention tone while the other 
half of the participants received a letter with the no intention tone. Differences in 
credibility ratings and reliance on management’s forecasts from period one to 
period two of the study were tested. 
 Hypothesis three predicted that the participants who received the financial 
results letter from management with the high intention tone would not lower their 
rating of management’s credibility as much than those who received the financial 
results letter from management with the no intention tone. The hypothesis was 
tested by having each participant rate management using the same credibility 
scale in both periods one and two. To compare the difference in credibility 
ratings, a difference score was calculated using period one and two credibility 
ratings. Higher difference scores indicated greater loss of credibility.  In looking at 
the difference in credibility ratings between the treatment groups (Table 29) a 
statistically significant difference was found, providing support for H3 in that 
participants who received the high intention financial results letter reduced their 
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perceived credibility of management less than participant’s receiving the no 
intention tone letter. 
In addition to testing the difference in credibility ratings between periods 
one and two, the difference in the reliance on management’s forecast was also 
tested between period one and period two (H4). It was expected that when 
management failed to meet its earnings per share estimates that participants 
would reduce the amount by which they relied on management’s forecasts. H4 
predicted that participants who received the earnings letter with the high intention 
tone would reduce their reliance on management’s forecast less than participants 
who received the earnings letter with no intention tone. However, the results 
indicated that the tone of the financial results letter was an insignificant factor in 
determining the loss of credibility from period one to period two of the study. 
Thus, there was no support for H4. 
Table 34 summarizes the overall results of the study. The study found 
support for H1 and H2 suggesting that management can influence the perception 
of its credibility by the tone it uses when communicating with investors. The 
increase in credibility was seen in both participants’ ratings of management’s 
credibility and the reliance on management’s forecast when predicting earnings 
per share. The study also found support for H3, which posited that when 
management fails to meet its earnings per share estimates, it can mitigate its 
loss of credibility by altering the tone of its written communications with investors. 
The impact of the financial results letter did significantly impact the difference in 
credibility ratings from periods one and two of the study. However, the financial 
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results letter was not a significant factor in the amount of reliance on 
management’s forecasts (H4) as there was no significant difference between the 
treatment groups in period two.  
An unintentional finding of the study involves the usefulness of 
management’s forecast. After receiving information from management, 
participants in the high intention treatment in year one had revised their earnings 
per share estimates above the actual earnings per share for the period while 
participants in the no intention treatment had revised their earnings per share 
estimates below the actual earnings per share estimates for the period. The 
impact of the difference between the year one treatment groups could be seen in 
the revisions of earnings per share predictions in year two. Participants who 
over-relied on management by selecting an estimate of earnings per share 
higher than the actual earnings per share for period one seemed to rely less on 
management’s forecast in period two. Participants who under-relied on 
management’s forecast, and who subsequently had earnings per share 
estimates lower than the actual earnings per share for period one, tended to rely 
more on management’s forecast in period two. This finding gives support to the  
findings from Williams (1996) who used market data to determine if the 
usefulness of management’s forecast was more important than the accuracy of 
management’s forecast.   
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Table 34: Summary of Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypothesis Dependent Variable 
Independent 
Variable Covariates 
Overall 
Model* 
Hypothesized 
Effect** 
Table 
Reference
    
H1 Credibility Rating 
Internal Control 
Letter 
FRAUD 
SOX RELATIONSHIP  
CONFIDENCE 
ASNO2  
FAMILIARITY  
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 
F= 7.94 
p<.000 
F = 6.49 
p =.006 Table 26 
H2 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Internal Control 
Letter 
FRAUD 
SOX RELATIONSHIP 
CONFIDENCE 
EXPECT MANAGEMENT- INFLATE 
EPS 
F = 5.86 
P <.000 
F = 4.27 
p = .021 Table 28 
H3 
Difference in 
Credibility Rating 
Earnings Results 
Letter 
STUDIED SOX 
INVESTED IN MUTUAL FUND 
F = 8.049 
p = .002 
F = 2.66 
p = .053 Table 30 
H4 
Difference in 
Reliance on 
Management’s 
Forecast 
Earnings Results 
Letter Useful 
F= 100.77 
p = <.000 
F = 1.34 
p = .125 Table 32 
* Two tailed test 
** One tailed test (adjusted for directional hypotheses) 
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5.2 Limitations  
 This study was designed as a laboratory experiment.  With appropriate 
controls for the effects of extraneous variables, the laboratory experiment sought 
to maintain high internal validity.  However, laboratory experiments may have 
lower external validity than field studies in which a real business task is being 
performed by experienced decision makers.  The lower external validity might 
limit the generalizability of the findings.  The experiment was designed as an 
abstraction of a task an investor might face. Participants were given limited 
background regarding a fictitious company. Although the limited information in 
the task reduces the external validity of the study’s findings, it is necessary to 
reduce the amount of variation for each participant to maintain internal validity at 
as high a level as possible. In this task all participants were given the same 
background information and financial statements. The only differences between 
experimental materials were the treatment effects. Therefore, given that 
participants were randomly assigned to treatments, any observed variation in 
participants’ responses should be due to either random (uncontrolled) individual 
differences between participants or the treatment conditions. Individual 
differences can be controlled through randomizing the participants into 
treatments and analyzing the tested differences post hoc using demographic 
questions as possible covariates. The individual differences measured and tested 
as covariates in this study did not alter the study’s findings.  
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 The use of students as participants in experiments can sometimes pose a 
threat to validity. However, in this study the use of student subjects does not 
represent a limitation. The study was designed to examine a theoretical link 
between management’s perceived intentions based on the tone of its written 
communications and investors’ willingness to rely on management’s guidance. 
Prior research (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Libby et al. 2002) indicates that when a 
theoretical link is being examined  students can be appropriate participants. Even 
if this study employed professional stock analysts, the amount or percentage of 
their adjustments to their earnings per share predictions could not be used to 
measure or predict future adjustment percentages but could only be used to 
show support for the theory that future judgments will be impacted by perceptions 
of management’s credibility. 
Another limitation in this study is a problem in the design of the study that 
was found only after all of the data were collected. The study was originally 
designed as a one period study to test the impact of altering the intention tone on 
the perceptions and amount of revision in estimates when participants had no 
prior knowledge of management’s prior forecast accuracy. It was decided that 
since the participants would complete the study in a short amount of time, it 
would be reasonable to extend the study to examine the impact of altering the 
tone of communications when the participants have prior knowledge that 
management has failed to forecast accurately.  In period one of the study the 
participants were allowed to select their initial earnings per share estimates. To 
control for the amount of surprise in management’s information between 
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participants, the forecast given by management was calculated as a percentage 
of the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate (132 percent). Participants 
were then allowed to alter their forecast after receiving management’s estimate. 
When the study was expanded to include the second period, a decision was 
made to hold the accuracy of management’s period one prediction to 109 percent 
of the participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. Thus, all participants would 
receive forecasts from management that were inaccurate by a constant 
percentage of management’s earnings per share estimate.  What was not 
considered in the design of the study was how the difference between 
participants’ revised earnings per share estimates and the actual results of 
earnings per share for the period would impact participants’ future reliance on 
management’s forecast. The participants who were in the high intention condition 
in period one revised their earnings per share estimate closer to management’s 
earnings per share estimate than the participants in the no intention treatment. 
Management’s estimates of earnings per share as well as the actual results of 
the period were calculated based on the participants’ initial earnings per share 
estimates. There was no difference between the treatment groups in the initial 
earnings per share estimates, but there were differences in the revised earnings 
per share estimates. When the actual results for period one were reported, the 
mean earnings per share estimate for the participants in the high intention 
treatment were higher than the actual earnings per share for the period, while the 
mean earnings per share estimates for the participants in the no intention 
treatment were lower than the actual earnings per share for the period. As a 
 139 
 
result, the participants did not begin period two on an even basis. The difference 
between the actual earnings per share for period one and the participants’ 
revised earnings per share estimates in period one drove the behavior of the 
participants in period two more than any of the treatments. The flaw in the design 
of the study may explain the lack of findings in period two.  The unintended effect 
was much more powerful than the treatment effect designed in the study.  
5.3 Contributions 
The findings from this study offer contributions to accounting research, 
accounting policy makers and to the psychology literature on persuasion and 
credibility. In accounting research, this study expands upon two prior research 
streams in accounting. With respect to the introduction of credibility scales in 
accounting, this study builds upon the findings of Mercer (2004, 2005) by 
expanding the two factor model of credibility, consisting of expertise and 
trustworthiness, to the three factor model of credibility, which includes the 
intention factor. The findings from period one of this study suggest that the 
intention factor of credibility should also be considered when measuring 
management’s credibility.   
Also with respect to accounting research, an unintended consequence of 
the design of this study (as discussed in the limitations and post hoc analysis 
sections) offers experimental support for the findings of Williams (1996) in which 
the usefulness of a prior earnings forecast issued by management impacts the 
reliance on future forecasts. While prior research had used the accuracy of prior 
forecasts, Williams (1996) suggested that the usefulness of a forecast and not its 
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accuracy would determine future belief revision. Williams (1996) defined 
usefulness as a forecast which improved upon initial earnings expectations. In 
this study the accuracy of management’s earnings per share estimates were 
identical between treatment groups, however, the participants who had predicted 
the earnings per share higher than the actual results (the high intention treatment 
group) relied less on management predictions in period two of the study than the 
participants with predictions of earnings per share less than the actual results 
(the no intention period one group). These findings indicate that forecast 
usefulness as opposed to accuracy is a better indicator of future forecast 
revisions when management issues guidance.  
This study contributes to accounting policy making. The PCAOB’s (2004) 
Auditing Standard No. 2, “An Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements” leaves the 
wording of the report up to management. The choice to leave the wording of a 
mandatory report to management could lead users to different decisions based 
on the wording used in the management reports. In this study altering the tone of 
communications with management was enough to impact management’s 
credibility ratings and the amount of reliance participants placed on 
management’s forecast estimates. These findings suggest that more research 
should be conducted to determine the impact of wording on the manner in which 
decision-makers use accounting reports. It is important to note that the different 
reports did not impact the participant’s initial earnings per share estimates, only 
the amount by which participants relied on management forecasts.  While this 
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seems insignificant, it suggests that research looking at the impact of different 
types of reports, such as differences in audit reports versus reviews and 
compilations, may not have been properly designed to measure the impact of the 
reports on investors’ decision-making.19 Many of these studies failed to find 
differences between decision makers when making immediate decisions such as 
the decision to lend, the interest rate at which to lend, and the maximum loan 
amounts (Strawser 1994).  However, these studies did not examine how the 
wording of the reports impacted other constructs such as management’s 
credibility. In this study management’s credibility was affected by the letters 
included in the financial statements, yet there were no differences between 
groups in their initial estimates of earnings per share for the company. The 
participant’s did however, show differences in their reactions to future decisions 
when given information by management. The lending decisions in prior studies 
were found to be based on the solvency of the company more than any of the 
reporting formats (Blackwell et al. 1998). Had the prior studies examined the 
impact of the different accounting reports on the bankers’ reactions to future 
events they may have found differences in how the bankers’ reacted to 
explanations of these future events based on the type of report the accountants 
issued to management.  
This study also contributes to the persuasion and credibility literature in 
psychology by further validating the three factor model of credibility presented by 
McCroskey and Teven (1999). Additionally, a task was examined where the 
perception of credibility (as measured by the McCroskey and Teven Credibility 
                                                 
19 See Strawser 1991,1994 for a review of prior research. 
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Scale) and actual decisions were compared when participants viewed reports 
that differed in the tone used to communicate information. The task used in 
presented an example of a single factor of credibility (intention) was manipulated 
and measured successfully. Prior psychological research has had difficulty in 
finding tasks to manipulate that test the individual sub-factors of the credibility 
model (O'Keefe 1990). 
5.4 Future Research 
Other scales of credibility could be used to examine how different factors 
may impact auditor credibility. Testing could be done to determine if wording in 
auditor reports could impact the perceived intentions of the auditors and thus 
impact auditors’ overall credibility. The standard wording in audit reports may 
reduce the impact those reports have on decision-makers.  
This study found support for the assertion that different forms of 
management’s statement on internal controls impact investors’ judgments. 
Currently, under Auditing Standard No. 2 management is allowed considerable 
latitude in choosing its wording in the required statement on internal controls. 
Future research could be conducted in this area to determine if standard reports 
with prescribed (or constrained) wording would allow for more consistent investor 
interpretations of the reports. Also, different standard reports could be explored 
to determine which format investors prefer. 
Future research could also focus on testing the impact of tone on actual 
investors and/or institutional investors. This study was conducted using students 
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who are a proxy for investors. Actual investor responses may alter the 
conclusions reached in this study.  
The model of credibility including the factors known to mediate the impact 
of credibility as discussed in the appendix should be examined further.  Path 
analyses can be used to examine if the covariates in the model follow the 
direction and strength of the theory.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This study presents strong evidence that the tone of communications used 
by management may impact the participants’ ratings of management’s credibility 
and the amount of reliance participants place on management’s forecasts. The 
robustness of this finding was also tested after management had failed to meet 
its earnings per share forecast. After failing to make a forecast, the tone of 
communications was able to mitigate the reduction in management’s credibility 
ratings by participants.  The tone of communications was not able to mitigate the 
loss of credibility as measured by participants’ reliance on management’s 
forecasts in period two of the study.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Moderating Factors That Influence Credibility or Its Impact on 
Belief Revision 
The model of credibility’s impact on belief revision used in the study accounts 
only for factors that are introduced in the study. There are other factors known to 
affect credibility or to impact the effect credibility has on belief revision. This 
Appendix describes these factors as mediators and moderators. Mediators are 
variables that will affect the level of credibility. Moderators will not affect 
credibility but rather impact the role credibility plays in belief revision.  
Mediating Variables of Credibility 
Two variables that can impact a person’s credibility are knowledge biases 
and reporting biases. Eagly and Wood (1978) propose that the position taken by 
a communicator will interact with the message recipient’s expectations of the 
communicator position. This interaction affects the message recipient’s perceived 
credibility of the communicator. These expectancy biases are referred to as 
knowledge bias and reporting bias (Eagly et al. 1978).  Both of these biases and 
their expected effect on credibility are diagramed in Figure 3 and will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
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Figure 3. Eagly, Wood and Chaiken (1978)  Reporting Bias and Knowledge Bias 
Knowledge Bias 
Message recipients may expect a communicator to advocate a certain 
biased position based on the communicator’s background. Eagly and Wood 
(1978) note the influences on a communicator can be internal or external. 
Internal influences are influences such as a person’s biological makeup (skin 
color, body composition, and gender). For example, people with a particular 
ethnic background are expected to favor programs and policies that benefit 
people similar to them. If, for instance, a law maker was a member of a protected 
class of individuals, via affirmative action, some message recipients of this law 
maker might believe he/she will be in favor of a particular affirmative action 
legislation that benefits his/her group. If he/she were to vote for this action people 
would assume it was because of their heritage. If they violated that expectation 
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and voted against the legislation, some message recipients would believe the 
action was taken based on the merits of the legislation (in spite of the legislator’s 
background) and therefore, more credible.   
  External influences are environmental factors that are expected to bias a 
communicator. Observers may feel that a communicator’s education about a 
specific issue is non-representative of the whole issue.  For example, a person 
with a degree from a Christian college might be expected to have a more 
conservative stance on some issues. If he/she were to take a more progressive 
stance we would assume he/she was taking this stance in spite of his/her 
background; that, therefore, his/her knowledge in general must be greater than 
previously expected.   
Knowledge biases can be thought of as a stereotype. People expect 
certain people to act a certain way. When this expectancy is confirmed, the 
persuasiveness of the communicator’s message may be reduced. It is believed 
that this reduction in persuasiveness is due to a reduction in the perceived 
expertise of the communicator (O'Keefe 1990).  Eagly and Wood (1978) reject 
the argument that confirmation of knowledge bias corresponds to the notion of 
expertise; the very notion that a person with a biased set of information would be 
thought of as an expert with respect to a field where his/her knowledge about the 
topic is biased seems counterintuitive. O’Keefe (1990) seems to be in 
agreement, stating that a communicator with a perceived knowledge bias is 
perceived as less competent.  
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Reporting Bias 
 A reporting bias occurs when a message recipient believes 
communicators may alter their message to conform to the audience to which they 
are speaking (Eagly et al. 1978).  Message receivers may discount an otherwise 
credible source when they perceive a reporting bias. Reporting biases are 
believed to occur when a communicator delivers a message that differs from 
his/her true beliefs because of perceived external pressures (Pastore and 
Horowitz 1955; Eagly et al. 1978). One example of a reporting bias is a message 
from a young Republican presidential candidate to members of the AARP 
(formerly the American Association of Retired Persons) about the need for 
expanding Medicare benefits. A person judging the credibility of the 
communicator may believe that this young Republican may not really feel that 
Medicare needs to change in as much as they believe the communicator is telling 
the audience what it wants to hear.  
 When a reporting bias is violated message recipients should deem the 
communicator more credible. In the example of the young Republican, if the 
message were consistent with the expectations of a young Republican and 
inconsistent with the desires of the AARP audience the communicator would be 
perceived to be more trustworthy with respect to communicating his/her true 
beliefs. Eagly and Wood (1978) believe that reporting bias corresponds fairly well 
with the trustworthiness factor of credibility in that violations of the reporting bias 
indicate a propensity to communicate assertions the communicator believes are 
valid without regard to the audience.  
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 With respect to financial forecasts, it is possible that negative news 
forecasts are a violation of a reporting bias. The expectation of positive 
information by investors is a perceived reporting bias. Investors expect 
management to release positive information, since the release of negative 
information causes the stock price of the firm to drop (Lev and Penman 1990; 
Skinner 1994; Kasnik and Lev 1995; Libby and Tan 1999). Therefore, when 
management releases negative information, it is opposite investor’s expectation’s 
(a disconfirmation of the reporting bias) indicating the credibility of the disclosure 
should rise. This appears to be supported by research, negative news 
announcements cause greater revision in market expectations and are therefore 
more credible (Skinner 1994; Stocken 2000; Rodgers and Stocken 2002). 2021 
Variables That Moderate the Effect of Credibility 
Other factors can influence the magnitude of the effect that credibility can have 
on a recipient.  Factors such as the recipient’s level of involvement with the task and the 
timing of identifying the communicator, along with the position of the message, can 
influence the magnitude of the effect of source credibility (O'Keefe 1990).  It is important 
to note that these factors should not affect credibility, only the amount of influence 
credibility has. I will discuss each of these factors. A flowchart is also presented ( 
                                                 
20 There is a possibility the market reacts to negative forecasts because of their form. Skinner 
(1994) found that negative news forecasts were usually point estimates.  Pownall and Waymire 
(1989) found that point forecasts revisions in general were more informative than other types.  
21 The studies mentioned were not specifically looking at reporting bias although the theory would 
help support their findings.  
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Figure 4) to aid in understanding how these variables interact with 
credibility.
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Figure 4. Moderating Variables to Credibility 
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Level of Involvement 
Recipients with a high level of involvement with respect to the message 
are less likely to be influenced by differences in credibility while perceivers with a 
low level of involvement are more likely to be affected by source credibility 
(Figure 5)  (O'Keefe 1990).  The relationship between involvement and sensitivity 
to source credibility is believed to exist because perceivers that are highly 
involved with respect to a particular subject are more likely to form their own 
opinions about the validity of the communicator’s statements. Recipients who are 
involved in the task at a high-level are more likely to pay attention to the details of 
the message and to pick apart the message and base the importance of the 
message on its content.  In the current study, all participants were believed to 
have a low level of involvement with the particular task. None of the participants 
in the study were expected to be experts in the field.  
Receiver’s 
Level of 
Involvement
Low Level of 
Involvement
High Level of 
Involvement
Credibility Means 
More
Credibility Means 
Less
Message
Characteristics
Mean More
Message Recipient’s Level of Involvement 
 
Figure 5. O’Keefe’s Level of Involvement Affect on Credibility 
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Timing of Identifying the Communicator 
The timing of identifying a communicator is also believed to impact the 
magnitude of effect from source credibility. When a communicator is identified 
before a message is received source credibility will have a greater impact on the 
perceiver. When the source is identified after the message is received the 
perceiver is believed to be more affected by the message characteristics than by 
the source credibility (O'Keefe 1990).  Figure 6 shows the relationship between 
identifying the communicator before and after a message. When a communicator 
is identified after a message has been given receivers are likely to pay more 
attention to message details as the message is delivered.   
Timing in 
Identifying the 
Communicator
After 
Message
Before 
Message
Credibility Means 
Less
Credibility Means 
More
Message
Characteristics
Mean More
Message 
Characteristics 
Mean Less
 
Figure 6. Timing of Identifying the Communicator 
Influence of Message Direction  
The position a communicator takes with his/her message can also affect 
the influence of credibility on the perceiver. A communicator can send a message 
that is pro-attitudinal or counter-attitudinal with respect the perceiver’s position on 
a topic (O'Keefe 1990). Pro-attitudinal messages are in line with prior beliefs of 
the perceiver. Counter-attitudinal messages are opposite what the perceiver 
 158 
 
believes.  Pro-attitudinal messages diminish the role of credibility in judgments; 
whereas, counter-attitudinal messages usually require a more credible 
communicator (Figure 7). It is important to understand that pro-attitudinal 
messages do not actually reduce the amount of perceived credibility of a 
communicator; they just diminish the role credibility plays in the judgment 
process for the perceiver. The diminished role of credibility could be a type of 
ceiling effect, in that a message recipient who already holds strong beliefs about 
a topic has less room for opinion change. Whereas when the message is in the 
opposite direction, the participant has more room for opinion change, and 
therefore, the role of credibility is enhanced, or at least appears to be as there 
will be more room for an effect to be found.  
Position of the 
Message
Pro-attitudinal 
message
Counter- 
attitudinal
Message
High Credibility 
Effects Diminish
High Credible has 
advantage 
 
Figure 7. Position of Message 
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Appendix B: View of Experimental Materials Used for Pilot Study 
 
The following pages show a screen shot of each stage of the experiment with 
a brief description of the picture.  
 
1. General Instructions: Participants are given the general instructions for 
completing the task. They are notified of their right to leave the exam at 
any time as well as their compensation for participating. 
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Appendix B Continued 
2. Informed Consent: Participants have an opportunity to read the 
Informed Consent form. They have a yes/no button to indicate 
voluntarily consent to participate in the experiment.  
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Appendix B Continued 
Informed Consent Continued 
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Appendix B Continued 
Informed Consent Continued 
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Appendix B Continued 
3. Instructions: An overview of the task is then given to each participant. 
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Appendix B Continued 
Instructions: An overview of the task is then given to each participant.  
Continued
 
 165 
 
Appendix B Continued 
4. Background Information: Participants are instructed as to their role in 
the task. 
 
 
5. Company Background: Participants are given a brief background about 
the company. 
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Appendix B Continued 
6. Products: Participants are told about the products the company 
produces.  
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Appendix B Continued 
7. Internal Control Letter: Participants are given the letter from 
management, “Assessment of Internal Controls Over Financial 
Reporting.”  At this point participants are broken into two groups: 
a. Internal Control High Intention letter. 
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Appendix B Continued 
b. Internal Control No Intention letter.  
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Appendix B Continued 
8. Financial Statements: All participants are given the prior income 
statement and balance sheet information. 
 
9. Earnings Per Share Prediction One Period One: Participants give an 
estimate of earnings per share. 
 
 
 170 
 
Appendix B Continued 
10. Management’s Earnings Per Share Prediction Period One: 
Management provides participants with its earnings per share 
prediction for the same period. Management’s prediction is 132 
percent of the participant’s earnings per share estimate for the same 
period. 
 
 
 
11. Earnings Per Share Prediction Two Period One: Participants are given 
an opportunity to revise their initial earnings per share predictions.  
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Appendix B Continued 
12. Credibility Rating One: Participants fill out the credibility instrument 
comprised of 18 Likert scale questions on an eleven-point scale.  
a. Six expertise factors 
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Appendix B Continued 
b. Six intention factors 
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Appendix B Continued 
c. Six trustworthiness factors 
 
 
 174 
 
Appendix B Continued 
13. Earnings Letter: Management informs the participants about the actual 
earnings per share for period one. This amount is 109 percent of the 
participant’s initial earnings per share estimate. This is 23 percent less 
than management’s prediction. There are two different earnings letters: 
 
a. High intention earnings letter. 
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Appendix B Continued 
b. No intention earnings letter. 
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Appendix B Continued 
14. Financial Statements Two: Participants are given a copy of the income 
statement for the first period in which they predicted earnings per 
share. This also included the three prior years of data.  
15. Earnings Per Share Prediction One Period Two: After reading the 
financial statements the participants are asked to make an earnings 
per share prediction for the next year. 
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Appendix B Continued 
 
16. Management’s Earnings Per Share Prediction Period Two: 
Management provides participants with their earnings per share 
prediction for the same period. Management’s prediction is 132 
percent of the participant’s earnings per share estimate for the same 
period. 
 
 
17. Earnings Per Share Prediction for Period Two: Participants are given 
an opportunity to revise their initial earnings per share predictions.  
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Appendix B Continued 
18. Credibility Rating Two: Participants fill out the credibility instrument 
comprised of 18 Likert scale questions on an 11 point scale.  
a. Six intention factors  
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Appendix B Continued 
b. Six expertise factors 
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Appendix B Continued 
c. Six trustworthiness factors 
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Appendix B Continued 
19. Manipulation Questions: Participants answer manipulation questions 
about both letters they have received. 
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Appendix B Continued 
Manipulation Check Questions Continued 
 
 
20. Covariate Questions – Fraud 
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Appendix B Continued 
Covariate Questions: Fraud Continued 
 
 
21. Covariate Questions- Sarbanes Oxley 
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Appendix B Continued 
22. Demographic Questions 
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Appendix B Continued 
23. Possible Covariate Questions: Prior Investment Experience  
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Appendix B Continued 
24. Theoretical Covariates Based on Appendix A 
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Appendix B Continued 
25. Feedback Screen 
 
 
26. Finished Screen 
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Appendix C: Pilot Study One Surprise Testing 
Please rate the following items independently 
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.23 
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of 
$1.35. 
 
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management 
predictions: 
Insignificant       Very Significant 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
Not Surprising      Very Surprising 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.55 
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of 
$1.86. 
 
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management 
predictions: 
Insignificant       Very Significant 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
Not Surprising      Very Surprising 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.75 
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of 
$2.28. 
 
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management 
predictions: 
Insignificant       Very Significant 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
Not Surprising      Very Surprising 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
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Appendix C Continued 
 
Industry analysts have predicted earnings per share of XYZ Company at $1.10 
per share. Management has issued a forecast predicting earnings per share of 
$1.54. 
 
Please rate the difference between the analysts’ predictions and management 
predictions: 
Insignificant       Very Significant 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
 
Not Surprising      Very Surprising 
|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|------------| 
1      2                3              4               5              6                7 
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